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π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix broken security check in SafeStaticFiles #90
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| Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
|---|---|---|
| @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ | ||
| ## 2025-02-21 - Path Traversal in Mix Endpoint API Parameter | ||
| **Vulnerability:** The `/projects/{project_id}/mix` API endpoint in `src/audioformation/server/routes.py` accepted a `music` parameter (meant to specify a filename within the `05_MUSIC/generated` directory) but directly passed it to `mix_project` without sanitization. This allowed directory traversal payloads like `../../../etc/passwd` to be used for background music resolution. | ||
| **Learning:** Even internal API inputs that map strictly to filenames inside an expected directory must be sanitized. A simple check for file existence (`if not bg_music_path.exists():`) is insufficient as it confirms existence but allows looking outside the bounded directory. | ||
| **Prevention:** Always use established sanitization helpers (like `sanitize_filename`) or bound checks (like `validate_path_within`) for any user-supplied string that forms part of a filesystem path. Ensure bypass parameters like `FORCE_NO_MUSIC` are handled before and mutually exclusively from sanitization. | ||
| **Prevention:** Always use established sanitization helpers (like `sanitize_filename`) or bound checks (like `validate_path_within`) for any user-supplied string that forms part of a filesystem path. Ensure bypass parameters like `FORCE_NO_MUSIC` are handled before and mutually exclusively from sanitization. | ||
| ## 2025-02-23 - Broken Security Check in SafeStaticFiles | ||
| **Vulnerability:** The custom `SafeStaticFiles` middleware in `src/audioformation/server/app.py` intended to block access to sensitive directories (like `00_CONFIG` and `.git`). However, it used `p = Path(path).lower()`, which raises an `AttributeError` because `pathlib.Path` objects lack a `.lower()` method. This effectively broke static file serving entirely (causing 500 errors) and represented a malformed security check. If such errors were ever 'swallowed' without raising an HTTP exception, it could result in 'failing open' and allowing access to sensitive files. | ||
| **Learning:** Security checks that rely on path manipulation or normalization must be carefully tested for runtime exceptions. An unhandled exception in a security gate can either block legitimate traffic (Denial of Service) or, if caught improperly elsewhere, fail open. Always normalize the string representation of paths before converting them to `Path` objects. | ||
| **Prevention:** Thoroughly test security middleware endpoints for both valid and invalid access attempts. Ensure that path string normalizations like `.lower()` are applied directly to the string before instantiating `Path(str(path).lower())`. | ||
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@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ class SafeStaticFiles(StaticFiles): | |||||
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| async def get_response(self, path: str, scope) -> Response: | ||||||
| # Normalize path for check | ||||||
| p = Path(path).lower() | ||||||
| p = Path(str(path).lower()) | ||||||
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There was a problem hiding this comment. Choose a reason for hiding this commentThe reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more. The Additionally, while fixing this crash, note that the security check on line 28 for
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| if "00_config" in p.parts or p.name.startswith(".env") or ".git" in p.parts: | ||||||
| raise HTTPException( | ||||||
| status_code=403, detail="Access denied to sensitive resource" | ||||||
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The
str()conversion is redundant here aspathis already a string. It is better to suggestPath(path.lower())in the prevention guide to avoid propagating redundant type conversions in security documentation.