Report privately through GitHub's report a vulnerability form, which is not public. If that is unavailable to you, open a normal issue saying only that you have a security report and asking for a private channel — no details in the public issue.
Expect an acknowledgement within a week. There is no bounty; this is one person's plugin.
Please include the plugin version or commit, your Omarchy version
(omarchy-version), and what an attacker would gain. A proof of concept helps
more than a description.
This plugin runs as unsandboxed QML inside the long-running Omarchy shell
process, and reads and writes files under ~/.local/share/omarchyform/. The
things worth attacking are:
- A board file. Boards are plain JSON, meant to be hand-edited, shared and committed, so a board is untrusted input. A board that reads or writes a path outside the data directory, or that makes the shell load a file of its choosing, is a vulnerability. Image items carry only a plain file name for this reason.
- The clipboard.
ctrl+vrunswl-paste. The clipboard chooses its own format and contents; the plugin chooses the destination name and directory. Clipboard contents steering where bytes land is a vulnerability. BoardFiles.sh. Paths are passed as arguments, never as shell source. Every path a board file, the clipboard or the board browser can influence is checked against its root before use: no.., no symlink below the root, no control characters. The paths it takes without a root are ones the person chose (a file dropped on the board or picked for import, and where an export is saved, which must be outside the data folder), the two metadata lookups (revisionandfilesize), the boundedreadof a file picked for import, and the command line's saves, which write the file they were given. A path that escapes its root, or that is interpreted rather than used, is a vulnerability.desktop/install.sh. It writes the launcher entry, the board file type and the small command they call, and refuses to replace a file it did not write. Overwriting or removing an unrelated file is a vulnerability.
Run npm run test:security for the portable regression screen, or
npm run test:security:full on a machine with Quickshell and Qt test tools.
Follow the release review checklist as well; it
records the data flows, intentional disclosures and limits of these checks.
Copied note contents must not appear in process arguments, environment variables or diagnostics. User-controlled labels must render as plain text; formatted notes and status messages must escape user content before markup.
- The plugin has no intentional network operations. Imported boards, images, filenames and clipboard contents are still untrusted inputs.
- Anyone who can already run code as your user can read your boards directly; the data directory has no protection beyond ordinary file permissions.
- Omarchy loads plugin QML with the shell's own privileges. That is the Quattro plugin model, not a flaw in this plugin — report shell sandboxing concerns to Omarchy.
The marketplace baseline scan and the portable linters used here are deterministic checks for documented patterns against an exact commit. Their output is evidence for that commit. None of them is a security audit, and a passing result is not a warranty.