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Security: uMaj35ty/ltop

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

ltop is a local-first monitoring tool: the TUI runs unprivileged, reads local kernel interfaces, and — only when you enable it — uses a privileged eBPF helper plus active LAN probes. This document describes the supported versions, how to report vulnerabilities, and the boundaries of the threat model.

Supported versions

Only the latest release line receives security fixes:

Version Supported
0.2.x (latest) ✅
older ❌ — please upgrade

Reporting a vulnerability

Please use GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting (Security → Report a vulnerability) — do not open a public issue for something exploitable. Include the affected target (Linux/macOS × x86_64/aarch64), a reproduction path, and your assessment of impact.

You will get a response within 7 days. Fixes land in the next patch/minor release; you will be credited in the release notes unless you prefer otherwise.

Threat model and boundaries

Process privileges

  • The TUI runs unprivileged. All kernel data comes from interfaces any process may read (/proc, getifaddrs, PF_ROUTE/netlink dumps, ephemeral UDP sockets). Killing/relaunching is limited to your own uid by the kernel.
  • ltop-bpf is an explicit, root-only helper (systemd service). It attaches kprobes, needs CAP_BPF + CAP_PERFMON (+ CAP_SYS_RESOURCE on kernels < 5.11), and writes one snapshot file. The shipped unit sandbox it: NoNewPrivileges, ProtectSystem=strict with only /run/ltop writable, ProtectHome, PrivateTmp, kernel-interface protections, and a bounding set with no CAP_SYS_ADMIN. It holds no listening sockets and makes no network connections.

Data on disk

  • Session logs (~/.local/state/ltop/) record connection endpoints, process names and hostnames and are created 0600.
  • /run/ltop/udp.json is world-readable by design (the unprivileged TUI reads the root-written snapshot). It contains per-process/per-socket byte totals only — on multi-user hosts this is visible to every local user; keep that in mind before deploying the helper on shared machines.
  • No telemetry: ltop never sends data anywhere beyond your own LAN probes. There are no update checks, no analytics, no phones-home.

Network behavior (LAN-active features)

The LAN box queries the local network: unicast mDNS, NetBIOS node-status and reverse-DNS lookups per neighbour, plus a configurable UDP "knock" sweep (one empty datagram to discard port 9 per subnet host, ≤ 1022 hosts, default every 60 s, toggleable). Replies are parsed defensively: transaction IDs are randomized per query and validated together with the source address; the parsers are bounds-checked pure Rust with fuzz-resistant fallbacks. The TUI renders untrusted strings through ratatui (control characters dropped), and the CLI output paths sanitize them explicitly.

Known, by-design trade-offs (not vulnerabilities)

  • --out/--csv/--replay accept arbitrary paths within the calling user's permissions — they are features, not privilege boundaries.
  • Exported CSVs of process names can contain spreadsheet-hostile content; fields are quoted and formula-prefixed (=/+/-/@ get a leading apostrophe), but treat exports as data, not code.
  • The eBPF sk_ino LRU has a documented, low-probability mis-attribution window after SLAB address reuse (see the roadmap).

Supply chain

Releases are built from tagged commits with --locked (Cargo.lock is committed). All GitHub Actions are pinned to commit SHAs; workflows run least-privilege (CI is read-only; only the release job holds contents: write, and the tap job's token never persists on the runner). Dependabot (actions + crates) and secret scanning with push protection are enabled on the repository.

There aren't any published security advisories