feat(payments-v2): transfer a coinless token by MastaP · Pull Request #782 · unicity-sphere/sphere-sdk

MastaP · 2026-09-10T15:56:00Z

Closes #777.

Completes the half of #777 that #779 (merged) deliberately left out. #779 was display and receive;
this changes the money path, which is why it got its own review rather than riding along.

A coinless token — one whose genesis data carries no value envelope — can now be moved:

payments.sendCoinless({ recipient, tokenId, memo? }): Promise<TransferResult>

A second verb, not a widened `send()`

The addressing model is genuinely different. A coin spend selects sources to cover an amount and
may queue for a combination that frees up; a coinless spend reserves the one token it was named.
No amount, no combination, no split, no change.

planCoinless therefore never queues: queueing waits for some other combination to become
available, and a named token has none — it would block until timeout on a spend that cannot become
possible. It applies the #738 fail-closed gate itself, because it bypasses freeView() where
that gate lives for coin spends; without it a restart could double-spend a source an open intent
already holds.

One money path, not two. Same TransferMachine, durable intent, checkpoints, mailbox deposit
and applyDelta. sendWithPolicy is a single loop over a SendJob union and the two spends
diverge in exactly one function.

The durable intent is discriminated

IntentPayload becomes CoinIntentPayload | CoinlessIntentPayload on a still-v:2 envelope — the
coin payload's stored shape did not change.

kind is REQUIRED on both arms. A missed writer must be a compile error, not a payload that
silently reads as a coin spend. The compiler duly found all thirteen coin-shaped reads, now
narrowed through machine/payload-view.ts.
A coinless payload names exactly one source (direct: [string] by type) and can never carry a
split — re-checked in resume.validatePayload rather than trusted across a decrypt boundary,
because a second leg makes settlePartial reachable with every conflict amount 0n, so a
remainder of '0' completes the intent and reports success for a leg that never landed.
An absent kind migrates to 'coin' (the only shape written before feat(payments-v2): represent and expose non-fungible tokens — tokens() drops every coinless token #777). An explicit
unknown one is refused — a coin-shaped payload from a newer client would otherwise execute
under semantics it was never written for.
Resume re-checks the decoded blob before transferring: an intent labelled kind: 'coinless'
whose named source actually holds coins would move them while its history row records assets: [].

Three gates keep a valued token out

Separate because each covers a different failure:

gate	catches
`spendableCoinless` (mirror)	the ordinary refusal
reservation ledger	concurrency — a second spend of the same token
decoded blob in `materializeCoinlessSpend`	the mirror being wrong — the blob is the authority

A proven conflict is TERMINAL for a named source. #625's bounded re-plan exists to pick a
different source after a lost race; a named token has no alternative. Re-planning also replaces the
true cause (source state already consumed by foreign) with a misleading "not a spendable coinless
holding", hiding from the caller that someone else spent their token.

Connect 2.1 → 2.2

A send_nft intent with its own nft:transfer scope. Additive, and the handshake gate is
MAJOR-only, so no existing dApp is cut off. The scope is deliberately not transfer:request —
reusing it would silently widen every dApp already holding it. Both directions are pinned by tests.
ConnectHost needs no change: an intent frame is params: Record<string, unknown> forwarded verbatim.

Naming (post-review)

Review flagged that token:transfer beside transfer:request distinguished nothing — and a
permission scope is read by a human in a consent prompt, so a code comment is the wrong place to
carry the distinction. The same defect ran through the SDK: "token" meant "coinless token" in a dozen
places, and coins are tokens too. TOKEN_TRANSFER was also already taken here — it named the
removed Nostr event kind 31113 (docs/LEGACY-INVENTORY.md), which a live test still asserts against.

One vocabulary per audience: the SDK says coinless (matching wallet-api's spec rule), the Connect
wire says nft, because that surface is read by a person for whom "coinless" communicates nothing.

kind: 'coin' | 'token'  ->  'coin' | 'coinless'      (durable intent field)
sendToken               ->  sendCoinless
SendTokenRequest        ->  SendCoinlessRequest
planToken               ->  planCoinless
materializeTokenSpend   ->  materializeCoinlessSpend
TokenIntentPayload      ->  CoinlessIntentPayload
send-token.ts           ->  send-coinless.ts

The discriminant is why this could not wait: it is field-encrypted into the intent payload the
server stores and read back on resume, so renaming it after a release is a data migration rather than
a refactor. Nothing had shipped, and the only kind: 'token' payloads that ever existed came from
this branch's own staging runs.

Left alone deliberately: tokenData(tokenId) works on ANY token and is named correctly, and
Token / tokens() keep meaning coin tokens — that ambiguity predates this work and renaming it
breaks every consumer.

Also fixed here

A bug in #779, found re-reading the mirror against §16: applyOne inherited assets on an ACTIVE
row that omitted them. But absent assets on an active row state coinlessness, so inheriting left
stale assets in tokens() while coinless was true — the same row in both reads, shown as an
NFT while holding 100 coins. Only a tombstone inherits now, which is what recoverRemoved needs.
Test written to fail first.

Verification

npm run test:run — 2302 tests / 132 files green.
npm run test:mutation — 150/150 KILLED.
npm run test:e2e — 5/5 green against wallet-api staging on testnet2, including a real
coinless token moved A→B: the send certifies on-chain, B accepting it implies the full real
trust-base verify + isOwnedBy passed (Receive screens before storing), the payload returns
byte-identical through a different wallet's blob fetch, and a valued token is refused before any
chain op with its coin still spendable afterwards.
typecheck, typecheck:tests, lint, build.
codex exec review over three rounds — five findings, all fixed and pinned by tests plus probes:
the two resume gaps above, the mintDataToken post-certification stranding, and a missing
SendCoinlessRequest export.

The mutation gate separately surfaced three coverage gaps, two of them real holes rather than
bookkeeping: nothing tested the #738 gate on planCoinless, and the blob guard was unreachable from
the layer it was tested at because the mirror gate refused first.

Rebased onto main after #779 squash-merged.

MastaP · 2026-09-10T17:24:54Z

@codex review

Out of draft — the implementation is complete. Since the draft, this branch gained
sendToken, the Connect 2.2 surface, docs, and three rounds of fixes from local
codex exec review passes.

Worth the attention, in rough order of consequence:

modules/payments-v2/machine/resume.ts — the durable-intent reader. Two fixes already
landed here from review: an EXPLICIT unknown kind no longer migrates to 'coin' (only an
absent one does, since that is the sole shape written before feat(payments-v2): represent and expose non-fungible tokens — tokens() drops every coinless token #777), and runOne now re-checks
the decoded blob before transferring, because a durable intent labelled kind: 'token' naming a
source that actually holds coins would move them while its history row records assets: [].
The three gates keeping a valued token out of sendToken — the mirror
(spendableCoinless), the reservation ledger (concurrency), and the decoded blob in
materializeTokenSpend. They exist separately because each covers a different failure; the blob
is the authority whenever the mirror disagrees with it.
SpendQueue.planToken — applies the fix(payments-v2): pinned tokens are not spendable balance, and the refusal says so (#737) #738 fail-closed gate itself, because it bypasses
freeView() where the gate lives for coin spends. It deliberately never queues: queueing waits
for another combination to free up, and a named token has none.
The terminal conflict rule in sendWithPolicy. Follow-ups from #621/#622: self-healing coin selection (P3), activity-panel UI (P4), wallet-api 429 subcodes #625's bounded re-plan needs an alternative
source; a named token has none. Re-planning also replaces the true cause with a misleading
"not a spendable coinless holding", hiding that someone else spent the token.

Verification on 54235c9d: 2302 tests / 132 files, 150/150 mutation probes killed,
typecheck, typecheck:tests, lint and build clean. codex exec review --base clean on the last pass.

Still owed and stated in the description: a staging NFT round-trip leg, alongside the coinless READ
leg #779 added. Everything here is exercised against fakes plus the aggregator-backed engine.

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…to read both shapes Reader before writer: nothing in this commit writes a token-addressed intent. It lands the union and the resume path that understands it, so a client can never meet a payload shape older code cannot parse. `IntentPayload` becomes `CoinIntentPayload | TokenIntentPayload` on a still-`v:2` envelope — the coin payload's stored shape did not change. `kind` is REQUIRED on both arms, never optional: a missed writer must be a compile error, not a payload that silently reads as a coin spend. The compiler duly found all thirteen coin-shaped reads, now narrowed through `machine/payload-view.ts` rather than by scattered `kind ===` checks. A `TokenIntentPayload` names EXACTLY one source (`direct: [string]` by type) and can never carry a split. `resume.validatePayload` re-checks both rather than trusting the type across a decrypt boundary, because a second leg would make `settlePartial` reachable with every conflict amount 0n — a remainder of '0' completes the intent and reports SUCCESS for a leg that never landed. An ABSENT `kind` reads as `'coin'`. That is a migration rather than a guess: it is the only shape any client wrote before this change. Also fixed, found while re-reading the mirror against §16: `applyOne` inherited `assets` on an ACTIVE row that omitted them. Absent assets on an active row STATE coinlessness, so inheriting left stale assets in `tokens()` while `coinless` was true — the same row in both reads at once, shown as an NFT while holding 100 coins. Only a tombstone may inherit now, which is what `recoverRemoved` actually needs. Caught by a test written to fail first. A token-addressed send records `assets: []` plus its `tokenId` in history, the shape wallet-api#151 accepts; `PendingTransfer` gains `tokenId` so an open token intent renders as the token instead of `coinId: ''` / `amount: ''`. Verified: 450 payments-v2 tests green; typecheck, typecheck:tests and lint clean. Refs #777.

payments.sendToken({ recipient, tokenId, memo? }): Promise<TransferResult> A second verb rather than a widened `send()`: the addressing model is genuinely different. A coin spend SELECTS sources to cover an amount and may queue for a combination that frees up; a token spend reserves the one it was NAMED. There is no amount, no combination, no split and no change. **One money path, not two.** The same `TransferMachine`, the same durable intent, the same checkpoints, mailbox deposit and applyDelta. `sendWithPolicy` is one loop over a `SendJob` union; the two spends diverge in exactly one place — `planAndMaterialize` — and nowhere else. `SpendQueue.planToken` reserves the named source behind the SAME #738 fail-closed gate `freeView()` applies: while the held-set is unproven nothing is spendable, or a restart could double-spend a source an open intent already holds. It never queues, because queueing waits for some other combination to free up and a named token has none — it would block until a timeout on a spend that cannot become possible. A token already held by another reservation is refused outright. **A proven conflict is TERMINAL for a named source.** #625's bounded re-plan exists to pick a DIFFERENT source after a lost race; a named token has no alternative, so re-planning would re-pick the same one or nothing. Retrying it would spin. Three independent gates keep a valued token out, because each covers a different failure: `spendableCoinless` on the mirror (the fast, ordinary refusal), `planToken`'s reservation check (concurrency), and a re-check of the decoded BLOB in `materializeTokenSpend` — the blob is the authority on what a token carries, and the mirror disagreeing with it is exactly the case where coins would move unaccounted for. `pool()`'s eligibility gates are now `isSpendable()`, shared by both verbs, so one probe covers both and they cannot drift apart. Extracted to stay under the 800-line ceiling the additions crossed: `modules/payments-v2/mint.ts` (the journal-first mint and its finalize, a pure move behind an explicit deps object) and `send-token.ts`. Verified: 2288 tests green (7 new, incl. a valued-token refusal, an unknown-token refusal that reserves nothing, a concurrent double-spend refusal, and a coin send proving selection never saw the coinless token); 6 new mutation probes; typecheck, typecheck:tests and lint clean. Refs #777.

Connect 2.1 → 2.2. Additive: the `send` intent and `transfer:request` scope are untouched, and the handshake gate is MAJOR-only, so no existing dApp is cut off. `send_token` gets its OWN scope rather than reusing `transfer:request`. Mapping it onto the existing one would silently widen every dApp that already holds it — a page granted coin transfers could move an NFT it was never authorised for. The two are independent in both directions, pinned by tests: `transfer:request` does not authorise `send_token`, and `token:transfer` does not authorise `send`. ConnectHost needs no change: an intent frame is `params: Record<string, unknown>` forwarded verbatim after the channel gates, so the wallet app's `onIntent` is what interprets it. The protocol surface guard did its job — it failed with "bump SPHERE_CONNECT_VERSION + update EXPECTED", which is exactly the prompt it exists to give. Counts move 14 methods / 6 intents / 13 scopes → 14 / 7 / 14. Verified: 2291 tests green (3 new on scope independence); typecheck, typecheck:tests, lint and build clean. Refs #777.

Covers the transfer half of #777 across the API reference, CLAUDE.md's method table and Key Concepts, and the CHANGELOG: why it is a separate verb, why a proven conflict is terminal for a named source, the three gates that keep a valued token out, and why send_token carries its own scope rather than reusing transfer:request.

…ken spend All three survivors were mine and all three were in the money path — each because the test asserted at the wrong layer, not because the probe was wrong. - The #738 fail-closed gate on planToken had no test at all: the facade tests never drive an unproven ledger. Now asserted directly on SpendQueue, both ways. - The blob re-check was unreachable from the facade: spendableCoinless refuses a valued token first, so the mirror gate killed every case before the blob guard ran. Tested against materializeTokenSpend directly, which is the layer the probe mutates — a mirror that says coinless while the blob carries coins. - Nothing drove a conflict on a token send. The new test seeds a SECOND coinless token, so if the re-plan ever ran it would have somewhere to go: moving a token the caller never named is worse than the failure.

Both from `codex exec review` of the transfer branch, and both in the resume path — which is the one I built reader-first specifically to be safe, so they matter more than their P2 label suggests. **An EXPLICIT unknown `kind` migrated to 'coin'.** Only an ABSENT discriminant may do that: it is the one shape written before #777. An explicit unknown one — a newer client's payload, or a corrupted one — was falling through to coin semantics it was never written for, and a coin-SHAPED payload makes the discriminant the only thing telling them apart. Now refused; the intent stays open and untouched rather than executing under the wrong meaning. **Resume did not re-check the blob.** `materializeTokenSpend` treats the decoded blob as the authority on what a source carries, but the resume path decoded its sources and went straight to transferring them. A durable intent labelled `kind: 'token'` whose named source actually holds coins would have moved them while the history row for it records `assets: []` — value moved, nothing accounted for. `runOne` now applies the same check and fails closed, which is what it already does for a missing source. Verified: 3 new tests staging raw intents the way a foreign client would write them (an explicit unknown kind, an absent kind still migrating, and a token intent naming a valued source); 2 new mutation probes; full suite green. Refs #777.

From the review. `sendToken` is on the public `PaymentsV2` surface but its request type was not re-exported, so a consumer of the `./payments-v2" subpath could see the method and not type a call to it. `CoinlessToken` was already reachable via the root `export * from './types'`; only this one was missing. Verified against the BUILT declarations, not just the source.

`sendToken` had no e2e coverage at all. Everything about the transfer was proven against fakes plus the aggregator-backed engine — which shows this client is self-consistent, never that it and the service agree. Two wallets, a real testnet2-certified coinless token with the registry's non-fungible type, moved through the deployed backend: - the send certifies on-chain and reports one direct leg, never a split - B ACCEPTING it implies the full real trust-base verify + isOwnedBy passed, since Receive screens before it stores or claims - the payload comes back byte-identical through a DIFFERENT wallet's blob fetch — the round trip survives CBOR encode, content addressing, S3, the mailbox, the claim and a second wallet's decode - the token leaves A, and A's balance is untouched throughout - a VALUED token is refused by sendToken against the real backend, before any chain op: the coin is still spendable afterwards Verified: 5/5 green against wallet-api staging on testnet2.

`token:transfer` sitting next to `transfer:request` distinguished nothing — the two read as the same thing, and a permission scope appears in a consent dialog where it has to be self-evident. A code comment is the wrong place to carry that. `send_token` had the same defect from the other side: coins are tokens too, so "send token" does not say which kind moves. INTENT_ACTIONS.SEND_TOKEN 'send_token' -> SEND_NFT 'send_nft' PERMISSION_SCOPES.TOKEN_TRANSFER 'token:transfer' -> NFT_TRANSFER 'nft:transfer' `TOKEN_TRANSFER` was also already taken in this repo: it named the removed Nostr event kind 31113 (docs/LEGACY-INVENTORY.md), so the constant collided with prior art that still appears in a test assertion. Pre-release: Connect 2.2 has not shipped, so nothing is renamed out from under a dApp. The spec's "coinless, never non-fungible" rule is about naming the PROPERTY in prose — for a scope a user reads in a consent prompt, "nft" is the word that communicates. Verified: full suite green; the protocol surface guard's EXPECTED updated with it.

…at names no coin Follow-through on the Connect rename: the same defect ran through the SDK side. "Token" was used to mean "coinless token" in a dozen places, and coins are tokens too — so the name distinguished nothing, exactly as `token:transfer` beside `transfer:request` did not. kind: 'coin' | 'token' -> 'coin' | 'coinless' (durable intent field) sendToken -> sendCoinless SendTokenRequest -> SendCoinlessRequest planToken -> planCoinless materializeTokenSpend -> materializeCoinlessSpend buildTokenPayload -> buildCoinlessPayload TokenIntentPayload -> CoinlessIntentPayload isTokenIntent -> isCoinlessIntent TokenSpendDeps/Input -> CoinlessSpendDeps/Input send-token.ts -> send-coinless.ts The discriminant is why this could not wait. It is DURABLE state — field-encrypted into the intent payload the server stores, and read back on resume — so renaming it after a release is a data migration, not a refactor. Nothing has shipped and the only `kind: 'token'` payloads that exist came from this branch's own staging runs, so the change is free exactly now and never again. One vocabulary per audience: the SDK says *coinless*, matching wallet-api's spec rule, and the Connect wire keeps *nft* (`send_nft`, `nft:transfer`) because a consent prompt is read by a person, for whom "coinless" communicates nothing. Unchanged deliberately: `tokenData(tokenId)` works on ANY token and is named correctly, and `Token`/`tokens()` keep meaning coin tokens — that ambiguity predates this work and renaming it is a breaking change for every consumer. Verified: 2302 tests green; typecheck, typecheck:tests and lint clean. The historical CHANGELOG entries about the removed `sendTokenTransfer` transport member were deliberately left alone.

The runner flagged them STALE rather than passing silently — the `find` strings pointed at `kind: 'token'` comparisons the rename replaced. Updated in place with the refactor, never dropped: a probe whose target moved is a probe guarding nothing, and deleting one hides that its invariant lost coverage. `sendtoken-conflict-replans` renamed to `sendcoinless-conflict-replans` to match the verb it guards.

…ue === null From review (P1). `materializeCoinlessSpend` and the resume twin both asked `token.value !== null`. But `bare_collection` — the bridged dialect carrying coins this SDK cannot decode — decodes to a null value exactly like a genuinely coinless token. Either guard would therefore have moved a valued token and recorded `assets: []` for it: coins gone, nothing accounted. This is the ambiguity `valueEnvelope` exists to resolve, and the rule is written into CLAUDE.md — `none_*` means "names no coin", `bare_collection` means "cannot read". I documented it, fixed one instance of it in the receive path after an earlier review, and then wrote the same bug into both new guards. `isCoinlessEnvelope` moves to `token-engine/value-envelope.ts` beside the type it interprets, and all three call sites use it. It was a private helper in Receive.ts — three copies of a question this subtle is how they drift apart again. Test seams needed for it: `engineWith` takes an explicit envelope, and the resume harness gains `forceEnvelope` so a bridged source can be staged at all. Neither path could express the case before, which is why neither caught it. Also fixes the CI lint break: a duplicated comment block in resume.ts (two paragraphs saying the same thing about the absent-kind migration) and the ratio in value-envelope.ts. Verified: 2307 tests green over two clean runs; typecheck, typecheck:tests, lint. Probes retargeted onto the envelope check, plus one new on the shared helper.

MastaP · 2026-09-11T10:50:55Z

@codex review

Head is 11976e2d. Since your last pass this PR was rebased onto main (#779 squash-merged),
renamed throughout, and carries a fix for the P1 you raised.

Your P1 is fixed — and it was the sharp one. materializeCoinlessSpend and its resume twin
both asked token.value !== null, which is true for bare_collection as well as for a genuinely
coinless token, so either guard would have moved a valued token while recording assets: [].
isCoinlessEnvelope now lives in token-engine/value-envelope.ts beside the type it interprets,
and all three call sites use it — it had been a private helper in Receive.ts, and three copies of
that question is how they drift. The test seams are the real tell: engineWith could not express an
envelope and the resume harness could not stage a bridged source, so neither path could represent
the failing case. Both can now.

Naming changed since you last read this, which is worth knowing before you diff:

kind: 'coin' | 'token'  ->  'coin' | 'coinless'      (durable intent field)
sendToken               ->  sendCoinless
TokenIntentPayload      ->  CoinlessIntentPayload
send-token.ts           ->  send-coinless.ts
send_token / token:transfer  ->  send_nft / nft:transfer   (Connect wire)

Worth your attention, in order of consequence:

machine/resume.ts — the durable-intent reader. It now refuses an explicit unknown kind
(only an ABSENT one migrates to 'coin'), and re-checks the decoded blob's envelope before
transferring.
The three gates keeping a valued token out of sendCoinless: mirror (spendableCoinless),
reservation ledger, and the decoded blob. The blob wins whenever the mirror disagrees.
planCoinless applies the fix(payments-v2): pinned tokens are not spendable balance, and the refusal says so (#737) #738 fail-closed gate itself, because it bypasses freeView()
where that gate lives for coin spends.
The terminal-conflict rule in sendWithPolicy: a named source has no alternative to re-plan
onto, and re-planning also replaces the true cause with a misleading one.

Verification on this head: 2307 tests / 132 files, typecheck, typecheck:tests, lint, build; e2e
5/5 green on live testnet2 including a real coinless token moved A→B with the payload byte-identical
through a second wallet's blob fetch. The full 151-probe mutation gate is mid-run — the previous
complete pass was 150/150, and the three probes retargeted onto the envelope check all kill.

chatgpt-codex-connector · 2026-09-11T10:54:49Z

Codex Review: Didn't find any major issues. Swish!

Reviewed commit: 11976e2d05

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MastaP marked this pull request as ready for review September 10, 2026 17:24

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Comment thread modules/payments-v2/send-coinless.ts Outdated

MastaP mentioned this pull request Sep 11, 2026

feat: coinless tokens — classify, hold, show and record them #779

Merged

Base automatically changed from feat/coinless-tokens-777-778 to main September 11, 2026 10:02

MastaP added 11 commits September 11, 2026 12:03

MastaP force-pushed the feat/coinless-transfer-777 branch from fd7fd59 to ec59c6d Compare September 11, 2026 10:05

MastaP changed the title ~~feat(payments-v2): transfer a coinless token — WIP~~ feat(payments-v2): transfer a coinless token Sep 11, 2026

MastaP merged commit 6adf639 into main Sep 11, 2026
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MastaP deleted the feat/coinless-transfer-777 branch September 11, 2026 11:11

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feat(payments-v2): transfer a coinless token - #782

feat(payments-v2): transfer a coinless token#782
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MastaP commented Sep 10, 2026 • edited Loading Uh oh! There was an error while loading. Please reload this page.

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A second verb, not a widened send()

The durable intent is discriminated

Three gates keep a valued token out

Connect 2.1 → 2.2

Naming (post-review)

Also fixed here

Verification

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MastaP commented Sep 10, 2026 •

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A second verb, not a widened `send()`