[HIGH] Connect approval/confirm modals show unverified dApp-supplied identity, not the verified origin

[KruGoL]

Summary

At every human decision point the user sees dApp-self-reported metadata (dapp.name/url/icon in the approval modal; a message-parsed Domain: line in sign_message) instead of the cryptographically verified origin. In the popup ConnectPage flow the verified origin is known (searchParams 'origin', enforced by PostMessageTransport.allowedOrigins) but it is not forwarded to the modal — it shows only in a status bar behind the full-screen overlay. SendIntentModal shows no dApp identity at all. sign_message blind-signs arbitrary text with attacker-controlled provenance.

Where

src/components/connect/ConnectionApprovalModal.tsx:71, src/components/connect/ConnectIntentHandler.tsx:271 (sign), src/pages/ConnectPage.tsx:120/181.

Note (verified against installed SDK)

ConnectHost does not echo the verified origin into onConnectionRequest, but the app pins and therefore knows it (allowedOrigins). Fix is app-side. Optional SDK enhancement: echo the verified origin back into the callback for defense-in-depth.

Fix

Forward the transport-verified origin into requestApproval/PendingApproval and render it as the primary, non-overridable identity in every approval and value/sign confirm modal (MetaMask-style). Treat dapp.* as untrusted decoration. Adopt domain-bound structured signing instead of blind signMessage.

Found by multi-agent audit @ main b477d4d; adversarially verified. Shares the "show verified origin" fix with the IframeAgent embed issue — do that one first, this reuses it.

[KruGoL]

Merged into the audit-fixes-2026-07 integration branch (fix/connect-verified-origin), building on #451's classifyAgentOrigin.

Done:

• requestApproval(dapp, permissions, origin) now carries the transport-verified origin; PendingApproval stores it. Both callers pass the pinned origin (IframeAgent: new URL(activeUrl).origin; ConnectPage: the origin search param behind allowedOrigins).
• ConnectionApprovalModal shows the verified origin as the primary trust anchor (header subtitle + a 'Site (verified)' block); dApp-supplied name/url/icon are demoted to a labelled 'Site says its name is' block (untrusted decoration).
• classifyAgentOrigin(origin) !== 'trusted' → an 'unverified site' warning; a reported-url host that disagrees with the verified origin → a red spoofing callout.
• 3 component tests (tests/unit/components/connectionApprovalModal.test.tsx). Full suite green (387), tsc + lint clean. No wallet/storage change.

Still open under the broader phishing-chain hardening:

• sign_message / SendIntentModal should show the same verified-origin anchor (this PR covers the connection-approval modal).
• CSP frame-src allowlist (also tracked on [HIGH] Untrusted DM deeplink → IframeAgent embeds any origin with a live wallet ConnectHost (phishing chain) #451).