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Is NEAR safe enough to settle agent money? A pre-registered, re-runnable test of NEAR's security budget (bug bounties, hack losses, who holds the keys) against Solana, Sui, Aptos and Base. Read-only, no keys.

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NEAR Security Budget

Is NEAR safe enough to settle agent money?
Three tests, fixed before the data was pulled, run against Solana, Sui, Aptos and Base. Anyone can re-run them with one command and no keys.

Rebuild check Tests: 36 passing Read-only: no keys, no transactions Python standard library only Claims anchored on NEAR mainnet License MIT

First screen of the dashboard: three rings for NEAR (bounty coverage 89.1%, one-signer upgrade path 44.0%, upgrade delay 0%), a ring per chain, eight key figures and the three verdicts

Built for the NEAR HACKATHON. Track: thesis (Investment Thesis). By Vibe Code Guy, bug bounty hunter.

Live dashboard: https://vibe-code-guy.github.io/near-security-budget/ (or open site/index.html from a clone, no server needed) · The thesis: THESIS.md · Screenshots of every section: docs/screens/ · Anchor on NEAR: DsdB2BqH…

In one minute

  • Problem. Agents that hold and move money need a settlement layer whose contracts cannot be quietly changed or drained. "Is this chain secure?" is usually answered with opinion.
  • Idea. Treat security as a budget you can measure: what an ecosystem pays to find bugs, what it has lost, and how many keys stand between an attacker and the contracts, all relative to the value secured. Write the tests and their pass/fail rules first, hash them, then pull the data.
  • Result. Three claims, each "NEAR meets the peer bar". The verdicts are the registered rules applied by code; nothing is scored by hand.
Claim Verdict The number that decided it The bar
C1 Bounty coverage HOLDS, with a caveat: can't tell under the stricter reading; the peer bar is zero in two of three size bands 89.1% of NEAR's top-10 TVL has a live public bounty peer median 41.8%, less 10 points
C2 Incident record FAILS NEAR lost 8.38% of its average TVL per year over 24 months peer median 2.37% to 2.77%
C3 Control FAILS 1 key on the Sputnik DAO factory can replace the DAO that owns intents.near; 0% of assessed TVL sits behind an upgrade delay more than one signer; delay on over 50%

What the data shows. On bounty coverage NEAR is at or above these peers. The gap is in the loss record and in control. The security discount comes from those two, not from bounty spending. The author, a bug bounty hunter, expected C1 to fail. It did not.

What would close the gap: an enforced upgrade delay; removing the factory path (deploy the merged fix, or turn auto_update off on the three DAOs that have it on); and, as a lesser point, a larger critical bounty cap.

Judge walkthrough: do X, see Y

In a browser, no install (about 3 minutes):

# Do See
1 Open the live dashboard: https://vibe-code-guy.github.io/near-security-budget/ Rings for NEAR and each peer chain, eight key figures (8.38%, 89.1%, 1, 0%, $3.8M, 29 min, 36 h 27 min, $300K) and three verdict panels: C1 HOLDS with its caveat, C2 FAILS, C3 FAILS
2 On the dashboard, go to Losses (C2) and hover the bars NEAR 8.38% per year, Solana 2.62–2.87%, Sui 9.97%, Aptos 2.13%, Base 0.30–2.66%, with the peer median line at 2.37–2.77%. Below: the 98 hack rows; click Amount to sort
3 Go to Control (C3) A matrix of seven protocols by pause, upgrade, move funds and delay. Three show a red 1 under upgrade; every row shows none under delay. Below it, the control path for intents.near with one red arrow: "1 key: replace the DAO's code, no vote"
4 Go to 1 October The NEAR Intents exploit to scale: undetected 39 h 50 min, paused 29 min after detection, fixed 35 h 58 min after the pause. Every event links to its source
5 Open the anchor transaction on nearblocks A set call on social.near by near-thesis.near storing the SHA-256 of the registered thesis and its commit id

With a clone (Python 3.9+, nothing to install, no API keys, no wallet):

# Do See
6 make all (or python -m pipeline build && python -m unittest discover -s tests -q) C2: fails | NEAR lower/upper %/yr: 8.378968 8.378968 | peer median: 2.374327 2.765235, C3a: fails | C3b: fails | C3: fails, C1a: holds | C1b: holds | C1: holds | coverage NEAR 89.06% vs peer median 41.79% | score 98.92%, C1 sensitivity (not registered): can't tell, site/data.js written, then Ran 36 tests and OK
7 git status after step 6 No changed files. The committed tables and dashboard data are exactly what the code produces; CI fails if they ever differ
8 Check C3 on chain yourself: the two view calls below Three FullAccess keys on sputnik-dao.near, and {"factory_id":"sputnik-dao.near","auto_update":true} from the DAO that owns intents.near
9 Check C2 by hand: open data/tables/c2_hacks_attributed.csv, filter chain = Near and in_24m_window = yes Three rows: Rhea Lend $18.4M, Sweat Foundation $3.5M, NEAR Intents $3.8M. Their sum, annualised over NEAR's mean TVL in data/tables/c2_loss_rates.csv, is 8.38%
10 git show f84b548:THESIS.md | sha256sum 2b99cec36f2b2d575367d2e053d006a3495df0fcbffc0294b52dd77ff921b58b, the hash anchored on NEAR and timestamped on Bitcoin
11 Optional, needs network: make data Every file in data/raw/ re-fetched; data/raw/manifest.json updated with retrieval times and NEAR block heights. The frozen universe is not changed. Numbers move with the market; the committed cache is what the results use

Check the one-key path yourself

Read-only, no account needed:

curl -s https://free.rpc.fastnear.com -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":"1","method":"query","params":{"request_type":"view_access_key_list","finality":"final","account_id":"sputnik-dao.near"}}'
curl -s https://free.rpc.fastnear.com -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":"1","method":"query","params":{"request_type":"call_function","finality":"final","account_id":"intents.sputnik-dao.near","method_name":"get_factory_info","args_base64":"e30="}}'

The first lists the factory's keys (three with "permission":"FullAccess" when this was written). The second returns a byte array that decodes to {"factory_id":"sputnik-dao.near","auto_update":true}. The DAO code these DAOs run accepts a code replacement from the factory, with no vote, when auto_update is true. The dashboard's C3 section walks through it.

Guide for judges

If you want to check Look at
What was claimed, and the pass/fail rules THESIS.md sections 1 to 5
What the author knew beforehand, and his conflict of interest THESIS.md sections 2 and 3
The evidence, for and against THESIS.md section 9; the dashboard
Everything decided after the claims were registered THESIS.md section 10 (14 entries)
That the claims came before the data Pre-registration below
Any single number data/tables/ (CSV and JSON), rebuilt by make all
Where a number came from data/raw/manifest.json: source URL or view call, retrieval time, SHA-256, block height
How a verdict is computed pipeline/c1.py, pipeline/c2.py, pipeline/c3.py; rules unit-tested in tests/
Who can upgrade what on NEAR data/c3_findings.json (hand-read trace) and data/raw/near/ (cached chain state)

Track

Track How this project fits
thesis Investment Thesis A long-term thesis for NEAR backed by on-chain data, a live dashboard and a model anyone can re-run. Judged on the evidence: two of the three claims fail, and the write-up says so

How it works

flowchart LR
  A[THESIS.md<br/>claims + kill criteria] -->|hash| B[OpenTimestamps<br/>+ NEAR anchor]
  C[DefiLlama<br/>TVL, hacks, fees] --> E[data/raw<br/>cache + manifest]
  D[NEAR mainnet<br/>view calls, 54 accounts] --> E
  F[bounties.csv<br/>published terms] --> G
  E --> G[pipeline<br/>c1 / c2 / c3 / timeline]
  A --> G
  G --> H[data/tables<br/>verdicts + tables]
  H --> I[site/index.html<br/>dashboard]
  H --> J[CI<br/>fails if outputs drift]
Loading
  1. Register. The thesis, three claims and their kill criteria are written in THESIS.md, committed, hashed, timestamped and anchored on NEAR.
  2. Pull. make data fetches DefiLlama data and runs read-only view calls on NEAR mainnet, caching every response with its retrieval time and block height.
  3. Compute. make all rebuilds every table and verdict from the cache, with no network, and runs the tests.
  4. Show. The dashboard reads one generated file, site/data.js. Every chart states its finding, its unit and date, and the query behind it.

The three claims

C1 Bounty coverage C2 Incident record C3 Control
Question Are NEAR's ten largest protocols covered by public bug bounties as well as peers', size for size? Has NEAR lost no more to hacks over 24 months, relative to what it held? Can one signer upgrade or drain intents.near or the largest NEAR protocols, and is there an upgrade delay?
Data 51 listings; published bounty terms; DefiLlama TVL DefiLlama hacks and chain TVL history, 730 days View calls on 54 NEAR accounts; open-source contract code
Verdict Holds, with a caveat Fails Fails on both tests
Read first The bar is zero in two of three size bands, and 24 of 51 lookups were not finished Sui is worse than NEAR; NEAR's figure rests on three hacks The factory path was already public; this trace extends it to NEAR Intents

A case study traces the 1 October 2026 NEAR Intents exploit from chain data and the official postmortem: reports said "fixed within an hour"; the chain shows it was paused within the hour and fixed a day and a half later.

How NEAR is used

  • Read-only view calls on NEAR mainnet (https://free.rpc.fastnear.com, listed in the NEAR docs) for 54 accounts: view_account, view_access_key_list, and the contract views acl_get_permissioned_accounts, pa_all_paused, up_get_delay_status (near-plugins), get_policy, get_factory_info (Sputnik DAO), get_owner, get_contracts_metadata (Sputnik factory), and each protocol's owner views. Answers are cached in data/raw/near/ with the block height each was read at.
  • Open-source contract code, read at named commits to confirm what each role can do: near/intents, near/near-plugins, near-daos/sputnik-dao-contract, aurora-is-near/aurora-controller-factory, Near-One/omni-bridge, and the protocols' own repositories.
  • NEAR transactions for the case-study timeline: the pause, release registration, upgrade and unpause calls on intents.near and its upgrade controller, each with a source.
  • The claims are anchored on NEAR: the hash of THESIS.md is stored under near-thesis.near in SocialDB (social.near).
  • Protocols covered: NEAR Intents, Rhea (Lend, LST, Dex), Meta Pool, the NEAR bridge and LiNEAR, all controlled through Sputnik DAOs.

Pre-registration

Event When (UTC) How to check
Claims committed: f84b54871db3b51f5db5ff113b34ef0f76745f56 2026-11-13 06:45:58 git show f84b548:THESIS.md | sha256sum gives 2b99cec36f2b2d575367d2e053d006a3495df0fcbffc0294b52dd77ff921b58b
OpenTimestamps stamp of that text 2026-11-13 07:27 registration/THESIS.f84b548.md.ots; Bitcoin blocks 975645, 975648, 975658
First data pull 2026-11-13 07:28:54 data/raw/manifest.json
Anchor on NEAR 2026-11-13 11:41:07 account near-thesis.near, transaction DsdB2BqHAHxyY2Ud4GYcek7JirLYMJz2tLY1iDNAVXji, block 224358450

The NEAR anchor came after the first data pull, by about four hours. It proves the text existed at 11:41 UTC, not that it preceded the data. The evidence that it preceded the data is the OpenTimestamps proof (stamped about two minutes before the first pull) and the git history. Commit dates are set by the author's machine, so they are evidence of order, not proof.

Read the anchor back (view call, no account needed):

near contract call-function as-read-only social.near get json-args '{"keys":["near-thesis.near/near-security-budget/**"]}' network-config mainnet now

Check the timestamp: pip install opentimestamps-client, then ots verify registration/THESIS.f84b548.md.ots (needs a Bitcoin node), or drop the .md and .ots files on https://opentimestamps.org.

FAQ

Is this an attack or a vulnerability report? No. It is read-only: no keys, no transactions, no testing of any vulnerability, nothing sent to any contract. The factory mechanism in C3 was already public (the hackathon project Docket described it, and the fix is public pull request near-daos/sputnik-dao-contract #233). No separate notice was sent before publication; THESIS.md section 10 records that.

Why does C1 say "holds" if there is a caveat? Because that is what the registered rule gives. The caveat travels with it everywhere: in two of three size bands the median peer has no live bounty, so the bar is zero; and when unfinished lookups are not counted as zero, the rule says "can't tell".

Who filled the bounty table? An AI assistant with web access, on 2026-11-14. The author opened the four NEAR programme pages himself and the maximums match. 24 of 51 rows were entered as "not checked". How those rows count was decided after seeing the data and is logged in section 10.

Does C2 depend on which TVL you divide by? No. On a wider TVL base that includes liquid staking, NEAR's rate is 3.91% against a peer median of 1.40% to 1.72%: still above. That check was added after registration and is labelled so.

Is "one key" really one person? Chain state cannot tell. A key may be a hardware wallet or a shared key. The count is of keys that are each sufficient.

Can I trust the numbers without running anything? Run make all. It needs only Python, takes seconds, and CI fails if the committed outputs differ.

Is the dashboard hosted? Yes, on GitHub Pages: https://vibe-code-guy.github.io/near-security-budget/. The workflow .github/workflows/pages.yml redeploys site/ on every push. It also works from disk with no server.

Repository layout

Path What
THESIS.md Claims, kill criteria, what was known beforehand, evidence, limits, changes after registration
site/index.html, site/data.js Static dashboard; data.js is generated
site/vendor/echarts/ Apache ECharts 5.5.1 (Apache-2.0), vendored with its licence
docs/first-screen.png, docs/screens/ Screenshots: first screen, and one per section
pipeline/ fetch.py (make data), universe.py, c1.py, c2.py, c3.py, timeline.py, site.py, build.py
tests/ 36 unit tests of the attribution, band, threshold and verdict rules
data/universe.csv The 51 listings, frozen at the first data pull
data/bounties.csv, data/bounty_status_rules.json Bounty terms per listing, and how not-live and unfinished rows count
data/c3_targets.json, data/c3_findings.json Accounts read for C3, and the hand-read control trace
data/timeline_events.json Case-study rows and their sources
data/raw/ Cached raw responses and manifest.json
data/tables/ Every output table and verdict file
registration/ The registered text and its OpenTimestamps proof
.github/workflows/ rebuild.yml (CI: rebuild, test, fail on drift) and pages.yml (hosting, idle until enabled)

Status

  • Done: all three claims computed, with sensitivity checks; case-study timeline; dashboard; CI.
  • Not done: the per-control-set L2BEAT comparison column (given in words instead); Rhea Dex's control could not be read because its source repository was not found; 24 of 51 bounty lookups were not finished.
  • Hackathon baseline: every commit was made during the hackathon window.

Built with

  • Python standard library only (urllib, json, csv, gzip, unittest).
  • Plain HTML, CSS and JavaScript: no framework, no CDN, no build step.
  • Apache ECharts 5.5.1 for charts, Apache License 2.0, vendored unmodified in site/vendor/echarts/ with its LICENSE and NOTICE (from the echarts@5.5.1 npm package). The page loads nothing from the network.
  • opentimestamps-client (Python), used once to stamp the registered text.
  • Data: DefiLlama (free, keyless), NEAR mainnet RPC by FastNEAR, nearblocks explorer API for the timeline's transactions.

AI disclosure

Claude Code (Anthropic's coding agent) wrote the code and drafted the documents in this repository under the author's direction. The author chose the thesis and approved the claims and kill criteria. The bounty table was filled by an AI assistant with web access; the author checked the four NEAR programme pages. Commits carry no co-author line, so this section is the disclosure.

License

MIT, see LICENSE.

Related project disclosure

The same author also submitted Slay the Bear to NEAR HACKATHON (tracks memecoins, games): a memecoin and town game in one NEAR testnet contract. The two projects are independent and share no code.

About

Is NEAR safe enough to settle agent money? A pre-registered, re-runnable test of NEAR's security budget (bug bounties, hack losses, who holds the keys) against Solana, Sui, Aptos and Base. Read-only, no keys.

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