chore(deps): update dependency @vitest/browser to v3.2.7 [security]

[renovate]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
@vitest/browser (source)	3.2.4 → 3.2.7

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Vitest Browser: Exposed Browser Mode API Can Proxy CDP and Overwrite Config Files, Leading to RCE

CVE-2026-53633 / GHSA-g8mr-85jm-7xhm

More information

Details

Summary

Vitest Browser Mode exposes a cdp() API that forwards raw Chrome DevTools Protocol (CDP) methods over the Vitest browser WebSocket RPC. CDP is not gated by browser.api.allowWrite, browser.api.allowExec, api.allowWrite, or api.allowExec.

As a result, disabling Browser Mode write and exec operations does not prevent a browser API client from using CDP to perform equivalent actions. In a verified reproduction with allowWrite: false and allowExec: false, CDP Page.setDownloadBehavior set the browser download directory to the project root, and CDP Runtime.evaluate downloaded a controlled vite.config.ts. Vitest reloaded the changed config and executed attacker-controlled Node.js code.

When the Browser Mode API is also exposed to the network, this becomes remotely exploitable because the generated browser runner page exposes the API token, active session id, project name, and project root path needed to connect to the browser WebSocket API and select the target download directory.

Impact

This affects Browser Mode projects using a CDP-capable provider, such as Playwright Chromium, when the browser API server is exposed to the network, for example with --browser.api.host=0.0.0.0.

In this mode Vitest warns that write and exec operations are disabled by default, but the generated browser runner page exposes enough metadata for a remote client to authenticate to the browser WebSocket API while an active session exists. This includes the browser API token, active session id, project name, and serialized test config including the project root path. The attacker can then call Vitest's CDP RPC and use Chrome's download controls to overwrite vite.config.ts in the project root. When Vitest reloads the changed config, attacker-controlled Node.js code executes on the host running Vitest.

The same exposed CDP bridge also allows direct browser-session JavaScript execution through Runtime.evaluate. A separate local probe showed that CDP can navigate the browser to a file:// URL and read rendered file contents, but the primary verified impact is config-file overwrite leading to RCE.

Reproduction

For a concrete reproduction, start Browser Mode in watch mode using the official Lit example:

pnpm dlx tiged vitest-dev/vitest/examples/lit vitest-poc
cd vitest-poc
pnpm install

Configure the Browser Mode API to listen on all interfaces while explicitly disabling write and exec operations:

import { playwright } from '@vitest/browser-playwright'
import { defineConfig } from 'vite'

export default defineConfig({
  test: {
    browser: {
      enabled: true,
      provider: playwright(),
      instances: [
        { browser: 'chromium' },
      ],
      api: {
        host: '0.0.0.0',
        allowWrite: false,
        allowExec: false,
      },
    },
  },
})

Then start the test server:

pnpm test

Vitest serves the browser runner HTML and WebSocket API at http://localhost:63315.

While the browser session is active:

1. Fetch the generated browser runner page:

   http://localhost:63315/__vitest_test__/
   

2. Extract the embedded browser API token, active session id, project name, and project root:

   • window.VITEST_API_TOKEN
   • __vitest_browser_runner__.sessionId
   • __vitest_browser_runner__.config.name
   • __vitest_browser_runner__.config.root

3. Connect to the browser API WebSocket as a tester client:

   /__vitest_browser_api__?type=tester&rpcId=<fresh-id>&sessionId=<session-id>&projectName=<project-name>&method=none&token=<token>
   

4. Call the sendCdpEvent RPC method with:

   Page.setDownloadBehavior({
     behavior: "allow",
     downloadPath: __vitest_browser_runner__.config.root
   })
   

5. Call sendCdpEvent again with Runtime.evaluate. The evaluated JavaScript creates a Blob containing a malicious Vite config and clicks an anchor element <a download="vite.config.ts">.

6. Observed result:

   • vite.config.ts is overwritten with attacker-controlled content.
   • Vitest reloads the changed config.
   • The injected Node.js payload runs on the host.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 9.8 / 10 (Critical)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

References

• https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/security/advisories/GHSA-g8mr-85jm-7xhm
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53633
• https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/pull/10444
• https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/pull/10450
• https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/pull/10456
• https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/commit/385a1aefd4c2bfa5e7d58bf7c6834c929969f2c7
• https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/commit/63e3b2eee4d58da56786a6333f517b9b492528c7
• https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/commit/e4067b3b150005fd42cf75f994300119245806b9
• https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/releases/tag/v3.2.5
• https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/releases/tag/v4.1.8
• https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/releases/tag/v5.0.0-beta.4
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g8mr-85jm-7xhm

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

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@​vitest/browser: Browser Mode provider commands bypass the file-access permission gate

CVE-2026-73653 / GHSA-p63j-vcc4-9vmv

More information

Details

Summary

Browser Mode exposes a set of built-in "commands" that run on the Node.js side of the test runner and can touch the local filesystem (taking screenshots, managing Playwright traces, uploading files for <input type="file">, comparing screenshots).

Several of these commands accept a file path from the browser and act on it without checking the allowWrite permission gate and without confining the path to the project directory. A client that can reach the Browser Mode API can therefore read, create, overwrite, or delete files anywhere the Vitest process can access, even when allowWrite is false.

This matters most when the Browser Mode API is exposed to the network (for example test.api.host is set, or the dev server is reachable from another machine or origin). In that configuration allowWrite defaults to false precisely to block file access, and these commands bypass that protection. On a default localhost-only setup with trusted test code, there is no untrusted party in a position to exploit it. The gap still matters wherever you rely on allowWrite: false to contain untrusted test code, because these commands ignore that flag.

Affected commands and impact

Command	Operation	Impact
upload (Playwright + WebdriverIO)	Read	Arbitrary local file read; contents are loaded into the page and readable by test code. Highest-impact case.
takeScreenshot (Playwright + WebdriverIO)	Write	Writes a PNG to an arbitrary path (absolute path used verbatim), creating parent directories.
screenshotMatcher	Write	Writes reference/diff PNGs; directory derived from client path allows partial traversal.
stopChunkTrace	Write	Writes a Playwright trace .zip to a path escapable via ../ in the trace name.
deleteTracing	Delete	Deletes arbitrary files by path.
annotateTraces	Read (disclosure)	Records a client-controlled attachment path that the reporter copies into the attachments directory, disclosing file contents.

The writes do not let an attacker choose the file contents (they produce PNG images or trace archives), so the integrity impact is creating, overwriting, or deleting a file at an arbitrary path rather than writing a chosen payload. The reads (upload, annotateTraces) are more serious because they expose the full contents of an arbitrary file.

The fix adds, to every file-touching provider command, an allowWrite check for write/delete operations and path confinement to the project root (matching the existing fs command pattern), so client-supplied absolute paths and ../ traversal are rejected.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 9.4 / 10 (Critical)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L

References

• https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/security/advisories/GHSA-p63j-vcc4-9vmv
• https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/pull/10674
• https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/pull/10679
• https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/pull/10680
• https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/commit/33f96a145ef09ca6a43b4e555eb273e64a87be23
• https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/commit/5c18dd267ff7f47f24cab2f615a16b37d90feb7f
• https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/commit/b795e36b34969bec50b47a9f29d26f799a6a04fb
• https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/releases/tag/v3.2.7
• https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/releases/tag/v4.1.10
• https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/releases/tag/v5.0.0-beta.6
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p63j-vcc4-9vmv

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

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Release Notes

vitest-dev/vitest (@​vitest/browser)

v3.2.7

Compare Source

   🐞 Bug Fixes

• browser: Check fs access in builtin commands [backport to v3]  -  by @​hi-ogawa, Hiroshi Ogawa and OpenCode (claude-opus-4-8) in #​10679 (b795e)

    View changes on GitHub

v3.2.6

Compare Source

   🐞 Bug Fixes

• Pin last supported vite-node version  -  by @​sheremet-va (16f12)

    View changes on GitHub

v3.2.5

Compare Source

   🚀 Features

• api: Add allowWrite and allowExec options to api [backport to v3]  -  by @​hi-ogawa and Codex in #​10445 (af88b)

   🐞 Bug Fixes

• browser: Disable client cdp API when allowWrite/allowExec: false [backport to v3]  -  by @​hi-ogawa and Codex in #​10456 (385a1)

    View changes on GitHub

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