Email security@wave.online.
- We respond within 48 hours
- We follow a 90-day coordinated disclosure timeline by default (faster if the vulnerability is being actively exploited)
- Do not file public GitHub issues for security findings
We patch security issues on the latest minor version aligned with the current MoQ draft. Older draft alignments are EOL when the next draft ships.
| Version | MoQ draft (preferred) | Negotiation range | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0.x | draft-18 | draft-07 .. draft-18 | Supported |
| (future) 1.x | draft-20+ | drops drafts < 12 | Will replace 0.x |
moq-edge is a publicly-reachable Cloudflare Worker that handles untrusted media payloads from publishers and serves them to untrusted subscribers. The threat model focuses on:
- Resource exhaustion — publishers spamming objects, subscribers spamming subscribes, malformed frames consuming CPU
- Protocol-level injection — malformed MoQ control messages causing crashes or unintended behavior in the Durable Object
- Cross-tenant data leakage — track namespaces from one customer reaching another's subscribers
- Replay attacks — publishers replaying recorded streams as live
- Authentication bypass — unauthorized publish/subscribe without WAVE-issued capability tokens
We do not treat as in-scope:
- Cloudflare platform-level vulnerabilities (report directly to Cloudflare)
- DDoS at the network level (Cloudflare's edge handles this)
- Vulnerabilities in user-supplied media codecs (out of scope — moq-edge is transport-only)
- All HTTP routes parse input with Zod before dispatch
- Per-namespace and per-track rate limits in the Durable Object
- Object size cap via
MAX_OBJECT_SIZE_BYTESenv var - Subscriber count cap via
MAX_SUBSCRIBERS_PER_TRACKenv var - All inbound requests pass through the Cloudflare WAF before reaching the Worker
- Capability-token-based authentication for publish (TODO: subscribe — currently public for interop testing)
- The wire protocol implementation is currently a scaffold for interop framework testing. Full draft-18 compliance is on the roadmap (version negotiation is in place; message framing/object headers/FETCH/GROUP semantics ship in 0.2.x). Spec drift bugs in this period are tracked publicly and not treated as security issues unless they enable cross-tenant data leakage.
When researchers responsibly disclose, we list them here (with permission):
(empty — be the first)