Zephium treats security as the top priority. A browser is a hostile environment by nature, and we'd rather hear about a problem privately than read about it publicly.
Only the latest release receives security fixes.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| Latest release | Yes |
| Anything older | No |
Zephium stores account session tokens, provider API keys and MCP connection secrets (including OAuth tokens and environment values marked secret) in Windows Credential Manager or the macOS login Keychain. These are OS-managed vaults, not plaintext settings files. Credential Manager is scoped to the Windows user, not to the Zephium executable; it does not exclude malicious processes running as that user. Zephium does not maintain its own website-password vault.
On Windows, WebView2 owns cookies and site storage beneath
%APPDATA%\app.zephium\web-content\profiles\<id>\EBWebView (the development
identity and Work stores use separate directories). Zephium restricts its profile
root and individual profile-directory DACLs to the current user and SYSTEM before
admitting them, refusing access if restriction fails. The inheritable permissions also
apply to new children and Windows propagates them to existing inheriting children;
explicit or protected child ACLs are not reset. This is filesystem access control,
not encryption or protection against other processes running as the same user.
WebView2 password autosave and general autofill are disabled and read back before use. This prevents new saves, but does not erase older saved passwords or prevent their autofill, as documented by Microsoft's settings API. WebView2 owns its cookie encryption and keys; Zephium adds no app-bound layer. The pinned SDK exposes no supported app-bound encryption or custom storage-key hook. DPAPI-wrapped cookie keys do not protect against another process running as the user. Site storage (including localStorage and IndexedDB) and extension storage are not Zephium-encrypted vaults and may contain tokens saved by sites or extensions. Profile separation does not make them separate OS security principals. See Microsoft's user data folder and profile API documentation. Chromium's app-bound protection depends on its privileged service and supported installation, not a WebView2 setting that Zephium can enable.
On macOS, WKWebView and WebKit own website cookies, site data and native extension storage; system password autofill and passkeys remain system-owned. App-owned engine directories use owner-only Unix permissions. Zephium does not add a separate encryption layer to WebKit data. On either platform, general local data such as history, notes, conversations, downloads and connection settings is not a secret vault: sensitive text entered there, or connection values not marked secret, can be persisted as ordinary data. OS-account isolation and disk encryption remain relevant on both platforms; neither is a promise of resistance to malware already running as the user.
Do not open a public issue for security problems.
Report privately in either way:
- Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting.
- Email security@zephium.app.
Include:
- A description of the issue and its impact.
- Steps to reproduce (a proof of concept helps).
- Affected version / commit, and your platform (macOS or Windows).
We'll keep you updated and credit you in the release notes unless you'd rather stay anonymous.
Please give us a reasonable window to fix the issue before any public disclosure. We practice coordinated disclosure and won't take legal action against good-faith research.