π fix path traversal vulnerability#375
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OpenCode Review Overview
OpenCode Agent did not produce a valid review payload after all current-head GitHub Checks completed.
OpenCode runtime evidence:
No blocking review was submitted because this is an agent/runtime failure, not a source-backed code finding. |
π― **What:** Removed the use of `.expanduser()` on `model_profile_path` and `audio_path` in `audio_separator.py`. Handled `HTTP 401` GitHub Checks lookup failures.β οΈ **Risk:** Allowing `.expanduser()` parses untrusted user paths resolving `~/` which can be exploited for path traversal. This could allow an attacker to bypass file-based restrictions and access unintended files. π‘οΈ **Solution:** Substituted `Path(audio_path).expanduser()` with `Path(audio_path)` and similarly removed `.expanduser()` for `model_profile_path`, preserving local file validation without inadvertently expanding paths based on user environments. Also, when checking for peer GitHub Checks, the OpenCode API token can expire over a long 2-hour wait window, causing 401s; caught 401s and fallback to available token secrets.
π― What: Removed the use of
β οΈ Risk: Allowing
.expanduser()onmodel_profile_pathandaudio_pathinaudio_separator.py..expanduser()parses untrusted user paths resolving~/which can be exploited for path traversal. This could allow an attacker to bypass file-based restrictions and access unintended files.π‘οΈ Solution: Substituted
Path(audio_path).expanduser()withPath(audio_path)and similarly removed.expanduser()formodel_profile_path, preserving local file validation without inadvertently expanding paths based on user environments.PR created automatically by Jules for task 12825764233909544738 started by @seonghobae