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feat: complete DAL scope helper migration and error handling infrastructure#2701

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implement/dal-scope-helper-migration
Mar 16, 2026
Merged

feat: complete DAL scope helper migration and error handling infrastructure#2701
amikofalvy merged 22 commits into
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implement/dal-scope-helper-migration

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Summary

Completes the data-access layer hardening work started in PRs #2150, #2151, #2159. Migrates all ~35 DAL files from manual eq() WHERE clauses to type-safe scope helpers, fixes security gaps, enforces the DAL architectural boundary, and adds shared PG error handling infrastructure.

Spec: PRD-6291

What changed

  • Security fix (PRD-6292): Added ProjectScopeConfig to getTask, updateTask, listTaskIdsByContextId, getCacheEntry, and updateApiKeyLastUsed. All call sites updated. getApiKeyByPublicId/validateAndGetApiKey documented as intentional exceptions (auth discovery functions).
  • DAL boundary lint (PRD-6293): Extracted inline Drizzle queries from auth/auth.ts into data-access/runtime/auth.ts. Added lint check preventing Drizzle imports outside the DAL boundary.
  • PG retry utility (PRD-6294): Created packages/agents-core/src/retry/ with SQLSTATE-based error classification, withRetry/withRetryTransaction, isForeignKeyViolation, isSerializationError. Fixed crash bug in ledgerArtifacts.ts (missing optional chaining). Removed TEMPORARY DEBUG console.error calls. Replaced 3 ad-hoc FK violation checks in routes.
  • Scope helper generalization (PRD-6295): Verified ScopedTable<L> works with runtime tables. Added barrel exports from data-access/index.ts.
  • Manage DAL migration (PRD-6296/6297/6298): Migrated 22 manage/ files from manual eq() to scope helpers — 9 simple, 8 medium, 5 complex (including subAgentRelations.ts with 95 refs and evalConfig.ts with 83 refs).
  • Runtime DAL migration (PRD-6299): Migrated 15 runtime/ files to scope helpers.

Quality gates

  • Typecheck: 16/16 passed
  • Lint: 14/14 passed
  • Tests: 117 files, 1794 tests passed (+4 files, +81 tests vs baseline)

Test plan

  • All existing scoping isolation tests pass
  • New scoping isolation tests for getTask, updateTask, listTaskIdsByContextId, getCacheEntry
  • New unit tests for retry utility, error classification helpers
  • pnpm typecheck passes
  • pnpm lint passes
  • cd packages/agents-core && pnpm vitest run — 117 files, 1794 tests pass

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

amikofalvy and others added 13 commits March 15, 2026 03:21
…xport

- Add runtime table tests (conversations, tasks) to scope-helpers.test.ts
- Export scope-helpers and scope-definitions from data-access/index.ts barrel

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add ProjectScopeConfig to getTask, updateTask, listTaskIdsByContextId, getCacheEntry
- Add scoped updateApiKeyLastUsed with tenantId/projectId filtering
- Document getApiKeyByPublicId and validateAndGetApiKey as intentionally unscoped auth discovery functions
- Update all 11 call sites: executionHandler.ts (7), ArtifactService.ts (2), a2a/handlers.ts (1), contextCache class (1)
- Add scoping isolation tests for tasks and contextCache

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
… error

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…tion checks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…nt check

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ctComponents to scope helpers

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
… scope helpers

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…lpers

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The latest updates on your projects. Learn more about Vercel for GitHub.

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changeset-bot Bot commented Mar 15, 2026

🦋 Changeset detected

Latest commit: 0e94d78

The changes in this PR will be included in the next version bump.

This PR includes changesets to release 10 packages
Name Type
@inkeep/agents-core Patch
@inkeep/agents-api Patch
@inkeep/agents-manage-ui Patch
@inkeep/agents-cli Patch
@inkeep/agents-sdk Patch
@inkeep/agents-work-apps Patch
@inkeep/ai-sdk-provider Patch
@inkeep/create-agents Patch
@inkeep/agents-email Patch
@inkeep/agents-mcp Patch

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Click here if you're a maintainer who wants to add another changeset to this PR

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Solid work — this is a well-executed migration that closes real security gaps (unscoped getTask, updateTask, getCacheEntry, updateApiKeyLastUsed) and introduces clean shared infrastructure. The scope helper replacement is mechanically correct across all ~35 files, the retry module is well-structured, and the DAL boundary lint is a good guardrail. A few items worth addressing before merge.

Pullfrog  | Fix all ➔Fix 👍s ➔View workflow runpullfrog.com𝕏

async (params: { id: string }): Promise<TaskSelect | null> => {
const { id } = params;
const result = await db.select().from(tasks).where(eq(tasks.id, id)).limit(1);
async (params: { id: string; scopes: ProjectScopeConfig }): Promise<TaskSelect | null> => {
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Return type is Promise<TaskSelect | null> but result[0] returns undefined when the scoped query matches no rows. Callers checking === null would miss the undefined case. Either change the return type to Promise<TaskSelect | undefined> or add return result[0] ?? null;.

expect(correctTenant).not.toBeNull();
expect(correctTenant?.conversationId).toBe(conversationId);
});
});
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This test only verifies cross-tenant isolation. Unlike the tasks scoping test which has a dedicated cross-project case, there's no test that inserts a cache entry for projectA and queries with projectB. Add one to verify project-level isolation.

Comment on lines +94 to +97
export function isForeignKeyViolation(error: unknown): boolean {
if (!error || typeof error !== 'object') return false;
const err = error as Record<string, any>;
return err?.cause?.code === '23503' || err?.code === '23503';
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isForeignKeyViolation re-implements its own err?.cause?.code / err?.code extraction instead of using getPostgresErrorCode defined 40 lines above. Consider return getPostgresErrorCode(error) === '23503' for consistency — you also get the SQLSTATE format validation for free.

Comment on lines +100 to +104
export function isSerializationError(error: unknown): boolean {
if (!error || typeof error !== 'object') return false;
const err = error as Record<string, any>;
const code = err?.cause?.code ?? err?.code;
return code === '40001' || code === '40P01' || code === 'XX000';
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XX000 is PG's catch-all internal_error, not a serialization error. The test file references "Dolt XX000" suggesting Doltgres re-uses this code for serialization conflicts. A one-line comment here (e.g. // Doltgres uses XX000 for serialization-like conflicts) would prevent future readers from thinking this is an over-broad match.

Comment on lines +260 to +262
error?.cause?.code === '40P01' ||
error?.cause?.code === '40001' ||
error?.cause?.code === '55P03' ||
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This file still has inline retryable-error checks (error?.cause?.code === '40P01' || ...) rather than using the new isRetryableError() or isSerializationError() helpers. Worth migrating for consistency — or flagging as a follow-up if scope is intentionally limited.

Comment thread scripts/lint-data-access-boundary.sh Outdated
REPO_ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd)"

violations=$(
grep -rn "from 'drizzle-orm'" \
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The pattern from 'drizzle-orm' only matches the exact base import. Subpath imports like from 'drizzle-orm/pg-core' would not be caught. Today these all happen to be in excluded directories, but a future violation via subpath import would silently pass. Consider broadening to match from 'drizzle-orm (without the trailing quote).

Comment thread scripts/lint-data-access-boundary.sh Outdated
| grep -v 'node_modules' \
| grep -v '__snapshots__' \
| grep -v '.d.ts' \
| grep -v '^\s*//' \
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This ^\s*// pattern is dead code — grep -rn prefixes each line with filepath:linenum:, so lines never start with //. The // import filter on the next line partially compensates, but consider removing this line or replacing with a prefix-aware pattern like grep -v ':[ \t]*//'.

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PR Review Summary

(5) Total Issues | Risk: Medium

🔴❗ Critical (1) ❗🔴

Inline Comments:

  • 🔴 Critical: ledgerArtifacts.ts:120 Empty catch block silently swallows all errors during fallback artifact insertion

🟠⚠️ Major (1) 🟠⚠️

Inline Comments:

  • 🟠 Major: auth.ts:70-72 SSO registration failures use console.error instead of structured logging

🟡 Minor (3) 🟡

🟡 1) AGENTS.md:20 Documentation drift for check:dal-boundary

Issue: The pnpm check description lists checks as "lint + typecheck + test + format:check + env-descriptions + route-handler-patterns + knip" but does not include the new check:dal-boundary added in this PR.

Why: Developers consulting AGENTS.md will not know this check exists, potentially leading to CI failures when they unknowingly violate the DAL boundary.

Fix: Update line 20 to include dal-boundary:

pnpm check      # lint + typecheck + test + format:check + env-descriptions + route-handler-patterns + dal-boundary + knip

Refs:

Inline Comments:

  • 🟡 Minor: tasks.ts:29-32 Manual eq() clauses instead of projectScopedWhere helper (same applies to lines 59-62, 77-80)

💭 Consider (3) 💭

💭 1) runtime-contextCache-scoping.test.ts Missing scoping test for delete operations

Issue: The contextCache scoping test only validates tenant isolation for getCacheEntry, but the implementation has 8 additional functions that accept ProjectScopeConfig including delete operations like clearConversationCache.

Why: If someone accidentally removes projectScopedWhere from delete functions, data from other tenants could be deleted without detection. The risk is mitigated since all functions use the same tested helper.

Fix: Consider adding a scoping isolation test for at least one mutation operation:

it('clearConversationCache should not delete cache entries belonging to a different tenant', ...)

Refs:

💭 2) apiKeys.test.ts Missing scoping isolation test for updateApiKeyLastUsed

Issue: The PR adds ProjectScopeConfig to updateApiKeyLastUsed as a security fix, but tests use mocks that always succeed regardless of scopes. No test verifies that calling with tenant-b scopes won't update an API key belonging to tenant-a.

Why: While the impact is limited to timestamp pollution (not data leakage), it still violates tenant isolation principles.

Fix: Add a scoping isolation test similar to the tasks/contextCache patterns.

Refs:

💭 3) withRetry.ts:65-67 Transaction client type uses any

Issue: The withRetryTransaction function uses any for the transaction client type parameter, losing type safety for the transaction callback.

Why: Callers can pass any object to the transaction callback without TypeScript catching invalid operations. Practical risk is low since callers typically use properly typed Drizzle clients.

Fix: Consider making the db parameter generic to preserve transaction client typing:

export async function withRetryTransaction<T, TX>(
  db: { transaction: (fn: (tx: TX) => Promise<T>) => Promise<T> },
  txFn: (tx: TX) => Promise<T>,
  ...
)

Refs:


💡 APPROVE WITH SUGGESTIONS

Summary: This is an excellent infrastructure PR that significantly improves DAL security and consistency. The scope helper migration is thorough, the retry infrastructure is well-designed, and the DAL boundary enforcement adds valuable architectural guardrails.

Blocking recommendation: The empty catch block in ledgerArtifacts.ts:120 creates a silent data loss scenario — at minimum, log the error before swallowing it.

The SSO error handling, AGENTS.md documentation drift, and consistency issues are lower priority but worth addressing.

Discarded (9)
Location Issue Reason Discarded
scope-definitions.ts:26-28 ScopedTable uses any for column types LOW confidence, theoretical risk only — all actual tables use varchar columns
retryable-errors.ts:51-68 Error inspection uses Record<string,any> assertions INFO — acknowledged as standard pattern for error inspection
tasks.ts:23-35 Return type null vs implementation undefined INFO — minor type inconsistency, works correctly at runtime
withRetry.test.ts:88 Exponential backoff delay formula not explicitly tested LOW priority — formula is standard, jitter makes exact assertions difficult
runtime-tasks-scoping.test.ts:100 listTaskIdsByContextId missing project-only mismatch test LOW priority — adequate coverage from other tests
lint-data-access-boundary.sh:24-32 grep patterns broader than documented intent INFO — acceptable for current codebase structure
lint-data-access-boundary.sh:33-34 Comment filtering is imprecise INFO — works for known cases
lint-data-access-boundary.sh No corresponding skill file for DAL boundary OUT OF SCOPE for this PR
ArtifactService.ts:168-170 Graceful degradation lacks error differentiation Intentional graceful degradation pattern
Reviewers (8)
Reviewer Returned Main Findings Consider While You're Here Inline Comments Pending Recs Discarded
pr-review-errors 4 0 0 0 2 0 2
pr-review-architecture 8 0 1 0 1 0 6
pr-review-consistency 6 1 0 0 0 0 5
pr-review-devops 4 1 0 0 0 0 3
pr-review-tests 4 0 2 0 0 0 2
pr-review-types 4 0 1 0 0 0 3
pr-review-standards 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
pr-review-security-iam 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 30 2 4 0 3 0 21

Note: Security reviewer verified tenant isolation is correctly implemented. Standards reviewer found no issues.

Comment on lines +70 to +72
} catch (error) {
console.error(`❌ Failed to register SSO provider '${provider.providerId}':`, error);
}
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🟠 MAJOR: SSO registration failures use console.error instead of structured logging

Issue: The registerSSOProvider function catches all errors but only logs via console.error, which may not be captured by production logging infrastructure. The function then returns successfully, hiding the failure from callers.

Why: Administrators configuring SSO will not receive clear feedback about why registration failed. In production, debugging SSO issues requires structured logs with error codes and metadata for alerting. The current approach makes SSO failures silent and undiagnosable.

Fix: Use structured logger and consider propagating the error:

Suggested change
} catch (error) {
console.error(`❌ Failed to register SSO provider '${provider.providerId}':`, error);
}
} catch (error) {
// Log structured error for SSO registration failure
// Note: Using console.error for now since logger may not be available in auth context
// TODO: Consider injecting logger or throwing typed error for caller handling
console.error(`Failed to register SSO provider '${provider.providerId}':`, {
domain: provider.domain,
errorCode: (error as any)?.code,
errorMessage: error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Unknown error',
});
}

Refs:

Comment on lines +29 to +32
and(
eq(tasks.tenantId, params.scopes.tenantId),
eq(tasks.projectId, params.scopes.projectId),
eq(tasks.id, params.id)
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🟡 Minor: Manual eq() clauses instead of projectScopedWhere helper

Issue: This file uses manual eq(tasks.tenantId, ...) and eq(tasks.projectId, ...) clauses instead of the projectScopedWhere(tasks, params.scopes) helper that peer runtime DAL files use.

Why: Creates internal inconsistency. Files like contextCache.ts, conversations.ts, messages.ts, and apiKeys.ts all use the scope helper pattern. Using manual clauses here means this file won't benefit from any future enhancements to the helper.

Fix: Import and use projectScopedWhere for consistency:

Suggested change
and(
eq(tasks.tenantId, params.scopes.tenantId),
eq(tasks.projectId, params.scopes.projectId),
eq(tasks.id, params.id)
and(
projectScopedWhere(tasks, params.scopes),
eq(tasks.id, params.id)
)

Note: Same pattern applies to updateTask (lines 59-62) and listTaskIdsByContextId (lines 77-80).

Refs:

@github-actions github-actions Bot deleted a comment from claude Bot Mar 15, 2026
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itoqa Bot commented Mar 15, 2026

Ito Test Report ❌

18 test cases ran. 16 passed, 2 failed.

✅ The run covered API key management, relation APIs, run/A2A flows, eval queueing, and adversarial checks. Most behavior matched expectations, but code review confirms two real defects in input-validation/error-handling paths: invalid agentId values can be persisted when creating API keys, and invalid sub-agent/tool references can surface an internal 500 with query details instead of a controlled 4xx response.

✅ Passed (16)
Test Case Summary Timestamp Screenshot
ROUTE-1 API keys page loaded successfully with deprecated banner and accessible table state. 0:00 ROUTE-1_0-00.png
ROUTE-2 Created qa-pw-std API key via UI, observed one-time secret reveal, and confirmed persisted row after modal close. 0:00 ROUTE-2_0-00.png
ROUTE-3 Updated expiration and deleted qa-pw-std key; table reflected changes consistently. 0:00 ROUTE-3_0-00.png
ROUTE-4 Valid relation creation returned 201 and persisted scoped relation data. 2:41 ROUTE-4_2-41.png
ROUTE-5 Sub-agent and tool filter variants returned consistent scoped records with 200 responses. 2:41 ROUTE-5_2-41.png
ROUTE-6 Baseline run chat request returned HTTP 200 text/event-stream and completed with finish chunk plus [DONE] without transport failure. 5:25 ROUTE-6_5-25.png
ROUTE-7 Authorized A2A blocking and non-blocking requests returned controlled JSON-RPC error envelopes without server crash or malformed response. 7:19 ROUTE-7_7-19.png
ROUTE-8 Dataset item queue endpoint accepted both single-item and multi-item payloads with HTTP 202 and consistent queued counts using seeded local eval fixtures. 10:55 ROUTE-8_10-55.png
EDGE-3 Duplicate create path behaved correctly with initial 201 and subsequent 422 duplicate validation response. 2:41 EDGE-3_2-41.png
EDGE-4 Rapid double-submit produced one persisted qa-pw-race key and UI remained responsive. 0:00 EDGE-4_0-00.png
EDGE-5 On 390x844 viewport, create/update/delete actions were executable and key controls remained usable. 0:00 EDGE-5_0-00.png
EDGE-6 Five near-simultaneous requests using one conversationId all returned HTTP 200 SSE streams with valid chunk envelopes and no server crash signatures. 5:25 EDGE-6_5-25.png
ADV-1 Tampered x-inkeep-agent-id value did not alter effective scope; response stream initialized under qa-agent from API key binding with no cross-agent indication. 5:25 ADV-1_5-25.png
ADV-2 Cross-scope tampering attempts were correctly denied with 403 Forbidden and no foreign records exposed. 12:22 ADV-2_12-22.png
ADV-3 Payload-style name persisted as plain text after reload with no script execution behavior observed. 0:00 ADV-3_0-00.png
ADV-4 Spoofed metadata payload stayed bounded and returned a controlled JSON-RPC error response with no 500 crash or unauthorized execution signal. 7:21 ADV-4_7-21.png
❌ Failed (2)
Test Case Summary Timestamp Screenshot
EDGE-1 Security/integrity regression: invalid agentId was accepted and API key was created (HTTP 201) instead of returning controlled 4xx validation. 12:22 EDGE-1_12-22.png
EDGE-2 Invalid FK submissions returned 500 responses with internal query details instead of controlled 400 validation errors. 2:41 EDGE-2_2-41.png
API key create with invalid agentId returns controlled 400 – Failed
  • Where: Manage API POST /manage/tenants/{tenantId}/projects/{projectId}/api-keys.

  • Steps to reproduce: Submit API key create payload with a non-existent agentId while keeping tenant/project valid.

  • What failed: API returns 201 Created and persists an API key bound to agent-does-not-exist; expected a controlled 400 rejection.

  • Code analysis: I reviewed the API route, runtime API-key DAL insert path, and runtime schema constraints. The route only maps DB FK errors to 400, but the api_keys table does not enforce an FK to agents/projects, so invalid agentId values can be inserted without any FK violation.

  • Relevant code:

    agents-api/src/domains/manage/routes/apiKeys.ts (lines 179-203)

    try {
      const result = await createApiKey(runDbClient)(insertData);
      return c.json({ data: { apiKey: { ...sanitizedApiKey }, key: key } }, 201);
    } catch (error) {
      if (isForeignKeyViolation(error)) {
        throw createApiError({
          code: 'bad_request',
          message: 'Invalid agentId - agent does not exist',
        });
      }
    }

    packages/agents-core/src/data-access/runtime/apiKeys.ts (lines 91-109)

    export const createApiKey = (db: AgentsRunDatabaseClient) => async (params: ApiKeyInsert) => {
      const [apiKey] = await db
        .insert(apiKeys)
        .values({
          id: params.id,
          tenantId: params.tenantId,
          projectId: params.projectId,
          agentId: params.agentId,
          publicId: params.publicId,
        })
        .returning();
    };

    packages/agents-core/src/db/runtime/runtime-schema.ts (lines 138-160)

    export const apiKeys = pgTable(
      'api_keys',
      {
        ...projectScoped,
        agentId: varchar('agent_id', { length: 256 }).notNull(),
        publicId: varchar('public_id', { length: 256 }).notNull().unique(),
      },
      (t) => [
        foreignKey({
          columns: [t.tenantId],
          foreignColumns: [organization.id],
          name: 'api_keys_organization_fk',
        }).onDelete('cascade'),
      ]
    );
  • Why this is likely a bug: The production schema and insert path allow orphan agentId values, so route-level validation via FK detection can never enforce the expected 4xx behavior for invalid agents.

  • Introduced by this PR: No - pre-existing bug (code not changed in this PR).

  • Timestamp: 12:22

Sub-agent tool relation create with invalid references returns controlled 400 – Failed
  • Where: Manage API POST /manage/tenants/{tenantId}/projects/{projectId}/agents/{agentId}/sub-agent-tool-relations.

  • Steps to reproduce: Send create requests with invalid subAgentId and invalid toolId under a valid tenant/project/agent scope.

  • What failed: API responds 500 Internal Server Error and leaks failed SQL query details in the problem payload; expected controlled 400 validation errors.

  • Code analysis: I reviewed the relation create route, FK classifier utility, and schema constraints. The table has FK constraints that should produce a known FK violation on invalid references, and the route intends to map that to 400; however, FK detection is narrowly implemented and the runtime path still falls through to generic 500 handling.

  • Relevant code:

    agents-api/src/domains/manage/routes/subAgentToolRelations.ts (lines 251-264)

    try {
      const agentToolRelation = await createAgentToolRelation(db)({
        scopes: { tenantId, projectId, agentId },
        data: body,
      });
      return c.json({ data: agentToolRelation }, 201);
    } catch (error) {
      if (isForeignKeyViolation(error)) {
        throw createApiError({
          code: 'bad_request',
          message: 'Invalid subAgent ID or tool ID - referenced entity does not exist',
        });
      }
    }

    packages/agents-core/src/retry/retryable-errors.ts (lines 94-98)

    export function isForeignKeyViolation(error: unknown): boolean {
      if (!error || typeof error !== 'object') return false;
      const err = error as Record<string, any>;
      return err?.cause?.code === '23503' || err?.code === '23503';
    }

    packages/agents-core/src/db/manage/manage-schema.ts (lines 538-547)

    foreignKey({
      columns: [table.tenantId, table.projectId, table.agentId, table.subAgentId],
      foreignColumns: [subAgents.tenantId, subAgents.projectId, subAgents.agentId, subAgents.id],
      name: 'sub_agent_tool_relations_agent_fk',
    }).onDelete('cascade'),
    foreignKey({
      columns: [table.tenantId, table.projectId, table.toolId],
      foreignColumns: [tools.tenantId, tools.projectId, tools.id],
      name: 'sub_agent_tool_relations_tool_fk',
    }).onDelete('cascade'),
  • Why this is likely a bug: Production code has a clear, intended FK-to-400 mapping path but still emits a 500 with internal SQL details, indicating real error-handling failure rather than test setup noise.

  • Introduced by this PR: Unknown - unable to determine.

  • Timestamp: 2:41

📋 View Recording

Screen Recording

… queries

- agentFull.ts: syncSubAgentSkills queried subAgents with projectScopedWhere
  but the table PK includes agentId — could return wrong agent's subagent
  when two agents share a subagent ID. Fixed to agentScopedWhere.
- agentFull.ts: use AgentScopeConfig type alias instead of
  ProjectScopeConfig & { agentId: string } (identical but cleaner).
- artifactComponents.ts: agentHasArtifactComponents used projectScopedWhere
  with agentId filtered via JOIN — fragile, would break on refactor.
  Replaced with agentScopedWhere for direct scope enforcement.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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PR Review Summary

(0) Total Issues | Risk: Low

Delta Review Scope

This is a re-review scoped to changes since the last automated review (commit 30fd2cc2a). The delta consists of 1 commit touching 2 files:

File Change
agentFull.ts Fixed scope level from projectScopedWhereagentScopedWhere for sub-agent lookup
artifactComponents.ts Simplified to use agentScopedWhere helper instead of manual and(...) clause

Delta Analysis

The delta commit 3a62977c5 ("fix: correct scope level for subAgents and subAgentArtifactComponents queries") addresses a correct security concern:

Change 1: agentFull.ts:1340

- projectScopedWhere(subAgents, { tenantId, projectId })
+ agentScopedWhere(subAgents, { tenantId, projectId, agentId: finalAgentId })

This fix ensures that when looking up an existing sub-agent during updateFullAgentServerSide, the query is scoped to the specific agent, not just the project. This prevents a theoretical data leak where sub-agent data from a different agent in the same project could be matched.

Change 2: artifactComponents.ts:340

- and(projectScopedWhere(subAgentArtifactComponents, params.scopes), eq(subAgentRelations.agentId, params.scopes.agentId))
+ agentScopedWhere(subAgentArtifactComponents, params.scopes)

This simplifies the query by using the proper agentScopedWhere helper which internally applies the same constraints. The manual eq(subAgentRelations.agentId, ...) was redundant with the agent-scoped helper.

Change 3: agentFull.ts:79

- scopes: ProjectScopeConfig & { agentId: string }
+ scopes: AgentScopeConfig

Type cleanup to use the canonical AgentScopeConfig type instead of an inline intersection.

Verdict

All delta changes are correct and improve both security and code consistency. No issues introduced.


✅ APPROVE

Summary: The delta fix correctly tightens scope constraints from project-level to agent-level for sub-agent queries, addressing a potential cross-agent data exposure within the same project. The refactoring also simplifies code by using the proper scope helper. Clean, targeted fix — no concerns.

Prior Review Items (Not In Delta Scope)

The following items were raised in the prior automated review and remain applicable to the full PR scope:

  • 🔴 Critical: ledgerArtifacts.ts:120 Empty catch block silently swallows errors
  • 🟠 Major: auth.ts:70-72 SSO registration uses console.error
  • 🟡 Minor: AGENTS.md:20 Documentation drift for check:dal-boundary
  • Plus pullfrog review items on return types, test coverage, and lint patterns

These are not in delta scope but remain relevant for the overall PR merge decision.

Reviewers (1)
Reviewer Returned Main Findings Consider While You're Here Inline Comments Pending Recs Discarded
delta-review 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Note: Delta review was performed directly by the orchestrator as the changes were minimal and focused on a single scope-level bug fix.

@github-actions github-actions Bot deleted a comment from claude Bot Mar 16, 2026
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itoqa Bot commented Mar 16, 2026

Ito Test Report ❌

13 test cases ran. 10 passed, 3 failed.

✅ Most coverage areas passed, including API-key CRUD UX flows, cross-project isolation checks, eval endpoint handling, and authz/header-spoofing defenses. 🔍 Code-first verification found two production issues behind the included failures: API key creation currently accepts non-existent agentId values, and sub-agent tool relation FK errors are surfacing as 500 responses instead of controlled 4xx handling.

✅ Passed (10)
Test Case Summary
ROUTE-1 Created, updated expiration, and deleted an API key successfully in Project A.
ROUTE-3 Cross-project API key lookup correctly returned not found with no leakage.
ROUTE-6 Eval trigger accepted valid payload with expected queued/failed contract fields.
LOGIC-4 Cross-project conversation probe did not expose Project A data to Project B credential scope.
EDGE-3 API key workflow controls remained usable at mobile viewport (390x844).
EDGE-4 Back/forward project switching preserved scope coherence and isolation.
EDGE-5 Malformed eval payload was rejected and large valid payload remained controlled.
ADV-1 Cross-tenant/project relation probe was denied with no data exposure.
ADV-2 Forged run-scope headers did not alter authorized execution scope.
ADV-3 Stored XSS payload rendered as text without script execution.
❌ Failed (3)
Test Case Summary
ROUTE-2 API key create accepted invalid agentId and returned 201 instead of controlled rejection.
ROUTE-5 Invalid sub-agent/tool FK payload returned 500 internal server error instead of controlled 4xx.
ADV-4 FK fuzzing showed API key create accepting malformed-but-schema-valid agentId values with 201.
API key create rejects invalid agent foreign key – Failed
  • Where: Manage API POST /manage/tenants/:tenantId/projects/:projectId/api-keys

  • Steps to reproduce: Submit API key create payload with a non-existent agentId (for example 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000).

  • What failed: The endpoint returns 201 and persists the key with that agentId; expected behavior is a controlled 4xx rejection for invalid agent references.

  • Code analysis: The route only translates DB FK violations, but API key persistence is in runtime DB schema where api_keys.agent_id has no FK to the manage DB agent table, so invalid agent IDs are accepted without any existence check.

  • Relevant code:

    agents-api/src/domains/manage/routes/apiKeys.ts (lines 179–203)

      try {
        const result = await createApiKey(runDbClient)(insertData);
        return c.json({ data: { apiKey: sanitizedApiKey, key: key } }, 201);
      } catch (error) {
        if (isForeignKeyViolation(error)) {
          throw createApiError({
            code: 'bad_request',
            message: 'Invalid agentId - agent does not exist',
          });
        }
        throw error;
      }

    packages/agents-core/src/db/runtime/runtime-schema.ts (lines 138–160)

    export const apiKeys = pgTable(
      'api_keys',
      {
        ...projectScoped,
        agentId: varchar('agent_id', { length: 256 }).notNull(),
        publicId: varchar('public_id', { length: 256 }).notNull().unique(),
        keyHash: varchar('key_hash', { length: 256 }).notNull(),
        // ...
      },
      (t) => [
        foreignKey({ columns: [t.tenantId], foreignColumns: [organization.id] }).onDelete('cascade'),
      ]
    );
  • Why this is likely a bug: The implementation claims to handle invalid agentId via FK detection but the stored schema lacks an FK to agents, so invalid references are structurally accepted in production.

  • Introduced by this PR: No – pre-existing bug (code not changed in this PR)

Sub-agent tool relation invalid FK returns controlled error – Failed
  • Where: Manage API POST /manage/tenants/:tenantId/projects/:projectId/agents/:agentId/sub-agent-tool-relations

  • Steps to reproduce: Submit create relation payload with non-existent subAgentId and toolId.

  • What failed: Endpoint returns 500 internal server error and exposes failed-query detail instead of controlled client error.

  • Code analysis: The relation table defines strict FKs for sub-agent and tool; route intends to map FK violations to 400, but the FK detection helper only checks top-level code/cause.code, so wrapped DB errors bypass translation and bubble as 500.

  • Relevant code:

    agents-api/src/domains/manage/routes/subAgentToolRelations.ts (lines 251–264)

      try {
        const agentToolRelation = await createAgentToolRelation(db)({
          scopes: { tenantId, projectId, agentId },
          data: body,
        });
        return c.json({ data: agentToolRelation }, 201);
      } catch (error) {
        if (isForeignKeyViolation(error)) {
          throw createApiError({ code: 'bad_request', message: 'Invalid subAgent ID or tool ID - referenced entity does not exist' });
        }
        throw error;
      }

    packages/agents-core/src/retry/retryable-errors.ts (lines 94–98)

    export function isForeignKeyViolation(error: unknown): boolean {
      if (!error || typeof error !== 'object') return false;
      const err = error as Record<string, any>;
      return err?.cause?.code === '23503' || err?.code === '23503';
    }

    packages/agents-core/src/db/manage/manage-schema.ts (lines 523–547)

    export const subAgentToolRelations = pgTable(
      'sub_agent_tool_relations',
      {
        ...subAgentScoped,
        toolId: varchar('tool_id', { length: 256 }).notNull(),
      },
      (table) => [
        foreignKey({
          columns: [table.tenantId, table.projectId, table.agentId, table.subAgentId],
          foreignColumns: [subAgents.tenantId, subAgents.projectId, subAgents.agentId, subAgents.id],
        }).onDelete('cascade'),
        foreignKey({
          columns: [table.tenantId, table.projectId, table.toolId],
          foreignColumns: [tools.tenantId, tools.projectId, tools.id],
        }).onDelete('cascade'),
      ]
    );
  • Why this is likely a bug: Invalid FK inputs should deterministically become a client-safe 4xx, but the current handling path leaks into 500s despite explicit FK-mapping logic.

  • Introduced by this PR: No – pre-existing bug (code not changed in this PR)

  • Timestamp: 3:13

Malformed foreign-key fuzzing on relation/API key create – Failed
  • Where: Manage API key creation path under malformed agentId fuzz inputs.

  • Steps to reproduce: Fuzz agentId with schema-valid but non-existent values such as x and random UUIDs.

  • What failed: Requests for those values return 201 and create API keys instead of controlled 4xx invalid-reference responses.

  • Code analysis: Same production path as ROUTE-2: key creation relies on FK-violation catch, but runtime schema lacks agent FK and does not perform explicit existence checks before insert.

  • Relevant code:

    agents-api/src/domains/manage/routes/apiKeys.ts (lines 171–180)

      const insertData = {
        ...body,
        tenantId,
        projectId,
        ...keyDataWithoutKey,
        expiresAt: body.expiresAt || undefined,
      };
    
      const result = await createApiKey(runDbClient)(insertData);

    packages/agents-core/src/db/runtime/runtime-schema.ts (lines 141–157)

      {
        ...projectScoped,
        agentId: varchar('agent_id', { length: 256 }).notNull(),
        publicId: varchar('public_id', { length: 256 }).notNull().unique(),
        // ...
      },
      (t) => [
        foreignKey({
          columns: [t.tenantId],
          foreignColumns: [organization.id],
        }).onDelete('cascade'),
      ]
  • Why this is likely a bug: Fuzzed invalid agent references are accepted by production create logic because referential integrity to agents is not enforced at API or DB boundary.

  • Introduced by this PR: No – pre-existing bug (code not changed in this PR)

  • Timestamp: 14:20

📋 View Recording

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@github-actions github-actions Bot deleted a comment from claude Bot Mar 16, 2026
- tasks.ts: use projectScopedWhere instead of manual eq() chains;
  return null instead of undefined from getTask for type correctness
- retryable-errors.ts: isForeignKeyViolation uses getPostgresErrorCode()
  instead of re-implementing extraction; add comment explaining XX000
  is Doltgres's serialization code
- runtime-contextCache-scoping.test.ts: add cross-project isolation test
- runtime-tasks-scoping.test.ts: update assertions to expect null

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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PR Review Summary

(0) Total Issues | Risk: Low

Delta Review Scope

This is a re-review scoped to changes since the last automated review (commit dd27b55df). The delta consists of 1 commit touching 4 files:

File Change
tasks.ts Migrated from manual eq() clauses to projectScopedWhere helper; fixed return type to null
retryable-errors.ts Refactored isForeignKeyViolation to use getPostgresErrorCode() for consistency; added XX000 comment
runtime-contextCache-scoping.test.ts Added cross-project isolation test
runtime-tasks-scoping.test.ts Updated test assertions to expect null instead of undefined

Delta Analysis

The delta commit 16413b653 ("fix: address remaining PR review comments (1-5)") directly addresses prior review feedback:

Change 1: tasks.ts — Scope helper migration

- .where(and(eq(tasks.tenantId, ...), eq(tasks.projectId, ...), eq(tasks.id, params.id)))
+ .where(and(projectScopedWhere(tasks, params.scopes), eq(tasks.id, params.id)))

Correct — All three functions (getTask, updateTask, listTaskIdsByContextId) now use the projectScopedWhere helper, achieving consistency with other runtime DAL files like contextCache.ts and conversations.ts.

Change 2: tasks.ts — Return type fix

- return result[0];
+ return result[0] ?? null;

Correct — The return type Promise<TaskSelect | null> now matches the implementation. Previously, result[0] could return undefined when no rows matched, which would fail strict === null checks at call sites.

Change 3: retryable-errors.ts — Code reuse

- const err = error as Record<string, any>;
- return err?.cause?.code === '23503' || err?.code === '23503';
+ return getPostgresErrorCode(error) === '23503';

CorrectisForeignKeyViolation now uses getPostgresErrorCode() which includes SQLSTATE format validation (/^[0-9A-Z]{5}$/). This prevents false positives from non-SQLSTATE error codes and maintains consistency with the rest of the module.

Change 4: retryable-errors.ts — Documentation

+ // XX000 is PG's generic internal_error, but Doltgres uses it for serialization-like conflicts
  return code === '40001' || code === '40P01' || code === 'XX000';

Correct — The comment explains why XX000 (a generic PostgreSQL error code) is included in serialization detection, preventing future maintainers from removing it as over-broad.

Change 5: runtime-contextCache-scoping.test.ts — Cross-project test

it('getCacheEntry should not return a cache entry belonging to a different project', async () => {
  // ... creates entry for projectA, queries with projectB, expects null
});

Correct — Addresses pullfrog feedback that the original test only covered cross-tenant isolation. Now both tenant and project isolation are verified.

Change 6: runtime-tasks-scoping.test.ts — Assertion alignment

- expect(result).toBeUndefined();
+ expect(result).toBeNull();

Correct — Test assertions updated to match the new null return type behavior.

Verdict

All delta changes are correct and directly address the prior review feedback from pullfrog and claude reviews. The changes improve:

  • Consistencytasks.ts now follows the same scope helper pattern as all other DAL files
  • Type safety — Return type now accurately reflects the implementation
  • Code qualityisForeignKeyViolation reuses existing infrastructure
  • Test coverage — Cross-project isolation is now verified
  • Documentation — Edge case handling is explained

No new issues introduced.


✅ APPROVE

Summary: This commit cleanly addresses the 5 remaining items from prior reviews. The tasks.ts migration to scope helpers improves consistency across the DAL, the return type fix prevents subtle bugs at call sites, and the new cross-project test strengthens isolation guarantees. Well-executed cleanup — ship it! 🚀

🕐 Pending Recommendations (3)

Items from prior reviews that remain applicable to the full PR scope but are outside the delta:

  • 🟠 auth.ts:70-72 SSO registration failures use console.error instead of structured logging
  • 🟡 AGENTS.md:20 Documentation drift for check:dal-boundary (not mentioned in pnpm check description)
  • 💭 apiKeys.test.ts Missing scoping isolation test for updateApiKeyLastUsed
Reviewers (1)
Reviewer Returned Main Findings Consider While You're Here Inline Comments Pending Recs Discarded
delta-review 0 0 0 0 0 3 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 3 0

Note: Delta review was performed directly by the orchestrator as the changes were minimal (1 commit, 4 files) and focused on addressing prior review feedback with no functional changes beyond what was requested.

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PR Review Summary

(0) Total Issues | Risk: Low

Delta Review Scope

This is a re-review scoped to changes since the last automated review (commit 16413b653). The delta consists of 1 commit touching 1 file:

File Change
.changeset/sudden-cyan-centipede.md Added changeset for the DAL scope helper migration

Delta Analysis

The delta commit 6c11c7ef6 ("chore: add changeset for DAL scope helper migration") adds a changeset file:

---
"@inkeep/agents-core": patch
---

Fix cross-tenant data access in unscoped runtime DAL functions and migrate all DAL files to type-safe scope helpers

Changeset validation:

  • Package: @inkeep/agents-core is the correct package — the DAL changes are in packages/agents-core/src/data-access/
  • Semver: patch is appropriate — this is a bug fix (security) and internal refactoring, not a breaking change or new feature
  • Message: Accurately describes the two main changes: (1) security fix for cross-tenant access, (2) scope helper migration
  • Format: Valid changeset frontmatter with package name in quotes

Verdict

The changeset correctly documents this PR for release notes. No issues introduced.


✅ APPROVE

Summary: This PR has been reviewed across 7 passes with all significant issues addressed. The final delta is just a changeset file that correctly documents the security fix and infrastructure migration. The PR is ready to merge. 🚀

🕐 Pending Recommendations (3)

Items from prior reviews that remain applicable to the full PR scope but were assessed as non-blocking:

  • 🟠 auth.ts:70-72 SSO registration failures use console.error instead of structured logging
  • 🟡 AGENTS.md:20 Documentation drift for check:dal-boundary (not mentioned in pnpm check description)
  • 💭 apiKeys.test.ts Missing scoping isolation test for updateApiKeyLastUsed

These are lower priority items that can be addressed in a follow-up PR if desired.

Reviewers (1)
Reviewer Returned Main Findings Consider While You're Here Inline Comments Pending Recs Discarded
delta-review 0 0 0 0 0 3 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 3 0

Note: Delta review was performed directly by the orchestrator as the changes were minimal (1 commit, 1 file) — only a changeset file was added.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
@github-actions github-actions Bot deleted a comment from claude Bot Mar 16, 2026
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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PR Review Summary

(0) Total Issues | Risk: Low

Delta Review Scope

This is a re-review scoped to changes since the last automated review (commit 6c11c7ef6). The delta consists of 2 commits touching 2 files:

File Change
.changeset/sudden-cyan-centipede.md Softened changeset message wording
AGENTS.md Added dal-boundary to pnpm check description

Delta Analysis

Commit 1: 0e94d788d — chore: soften changeset message

- Fix cross-tenant data access in unscoped runtime DAL functions...
+ Add defense-in-depth tenant scoping to runtime DAL functions...

Correct — The new wording is more accurate and less alarming. "Defense-in-depth" accurately characterizes adding scope constraints to functions that already had some protection, while the old wording ("Fix cross-tenant data access") could imply a more severe vulnerability than was present.

Commit 2: 07a69b0ac — docs: add dal-boundary to pnpm check description in AGENTS.md

- pnpm check      # lint + typecheck + test + format:check + env-descriptions + route-handler-patterns + knip
+ pnpm check      # lint + typecheck + test + format:check + env-descriptions + route-handler-patterns + dal-boundary + knip

Correct — This directly addresses the prior review feedback (🟡 AGENTS.md:20 documentation drift). Developers consulting AGENTS.md will now know that check:dal-boundary is part of the standard check suite.

Verdict

All delta changes are correct:

  • ✅ Changeset message is more accurate and appropriately scoped
  • ✅ Documentation now reflects the new dal-boundary check
  • ✅ One prior review recommendation addressed

No new issues introduced.


✅ APPROVE

Summary: This PR has been reviewed across 8 passes with all significant issues addressed. The final delta includes a changeset wording improvement and documentation fix that addresses prior review feedback. The PR completes the DAL scope helper migration, closes security gaps, and adds solid shared infrastructure. Ship it! 🚀

🕐 Pending Recommendations (2)

Items from prior reviews that remain applicable to the full PR scope but were assessed as non-blocking:

  • 🟠 auth.ts:70-72 SSO registration failures use console.error instead of structured logging
  • 💭 apiKeys.test.ts Missing scoping isolation test for updateApiKeyLastUsed

These are lower priority items that can be addressed in a follow-up PR if desired.

Reviewers (1)
Reviewer Returned Main Findings Consider While You're Here Inline Comments Pending Recs Discarded
delta-review 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 2 0

Note: Delta review was performed directly by the orchestrator as the changes were minimal (2 commits, 2 files) — one changeset message edit and one documentation fix addressing prior feedback.

@github-actions github-actions Bot deleted a comment from claude Bot Mar 16, 2026
@amikofalvy amikofalvy enabled auto-merge March 16, 2026 23:17
@amikofalvy amikofalvy added this pull request to the merge queue Mar 16, 2026
Merged via the queue into main with commit abaefda Mar 16, 2026
11 checks passed
@amikofalvy amikofalvy deleted the implement/dal-scope-helper-migration branch March 16, 2026 23:29
inkeep Bot added a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 16, 2026
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itoqa Bot commented Mar 17, 2026

Ito Test Report ❌

17 test cases ran. 15 passed, 2 failed.

✅ Most scoped route, CRUD, isolation, and resilience checks passed across manage and run flows. 🔍 Two API-surface defects were verified in error-handling paths: invalid API key agent references can be created successfully, and invalid sub-agent/tool relation references can return a 500 that leaks SQL query details instead of a sanitized client error.

✅ Passed (15)
Test Case Summary Timestamp Screenshot
ROUTE-1 API keys listing remained project-scoped and excluded project B keys in project A. 0:00 ROUTE-1_0-00.png
ROUTE-2 API key creation succeeded and one-time secret reveal behavior worked as expected. 1:45 ROUTE-2_1-45.png
ROUTE-3 API key expiration update persisted in UI and legacy update compatibility succeeded. 2:25 ROUTE-3_2-25.png
ROUTE-4 Deleting project A key removed only the targeted key and preserved project B key. 4:41 ROUTE-4_4-41.png
ROUTE-5 Valid sub-agent/tool relation creation and filtered retrieval worked in project scope. 9:02 ROUTE-5_9-02.png
ROUTE-6 Chat lifecycle continuity was maintained across sequential calls for one conversation. 2:13:44 ROUTE-6_2-13-44.png
LOGIC-1 Dataset run trigger accepted missing-conversation scenario without fatal server failure. 1:55:02 LOGIC-1_1-55-02.png
LOGIC-3 Context retrieval remained project-scoped across shared conversation identifiers. 2:13:44 LOGIC-3_2-13-44.png
EDGE-1 Duplicate context identifiers across projects did not cross-load conversation artifacts. 2:13:44 EDGE-1_2-13-44.png
EDGE-2 Near-simultaneous chat submissions completed without race-path crash behavior. 2:13:44 EDGE-2_2-13-44.png
EDGE-5 Mobile viewport API key CRUD actions remained accessible and functional. 6:03 EDGE-5_6-03.png
ADV-1 Cross-project API key probing returned not_found and did not leak foreign metadata. 4:50 ADV-1_4-50.png
ADV-2 Rapid submit behavior stayed stable and did not corrupt API key UI state. 3:08 ADV-2_3-08.png
ADV-3 Malformed relation payloads were rejected while endpoint stability was preserved. 9:06 ADV-3_9-06.png
ADV-5 Interrupted long run recovered, and follow-up call on same conversation succeeded. 2:13:44 ADV-5_2-13-44.png
❌ Failed (2)
Test Case Summary Timestamp Screenshot
EDGE-3 Invalid agentId API key creation request returned 201 and created a key instead of rejecting the request. 2:31 EDGE-3_2-31.png
EDGE-4 Invalid FK relation creation returned 500 with SQL query details instead of a deterministic sanitized bad_request response. 9:04 EDGE-4_9-04.png
FK violation messaging for API key creation is deterministic – Failed
  • Where: Manage API key creation endpoint (POST /manage/tenants/{tenantId}/projects/{projectId}/api-keys).

  • Steps to reproduce: Send API key creation with a non-existent agentId in a valid tenant/project scope.

  • What failed: The endpoint returned 201 Created and persisted a key for agentId: "nonexistent-agent" instead of rejecting with sanitized bad_request.

  • Code analysis: The create route only converts DB foreign-key errors into bad_request, but the runtime API key table does not define an FK from api_keys.agent_id to agents, so invalid agent IDs are insertable and no FK exception is raised.

  • Relevant code:

    packages/agents-core/src/db/runtime/runtime-schema.ts (lines 138-160)

    export const apiKeys = pgTable(
      'api_keys',
      {
        ...projectScoped,
        agentId: varchar('agent_id', { length: 256 }).notNull(),
        publicId: varchar('public_id', { length: 256 }).notNull().unique(),
        keyHash: varchar('key_hash', { length: 256 }).notNull(),
        keyPrefix: varchar('key_prefix', { length: 256 }).notNull(),
        name: varchar('name', { length: 256 }),
        lastUsedAt: timestamp('last_used_at', { mode: 'string' }),
        expiresAt: timestamp('expires_at', { mode: 'string' }),
        ...timestamps,
      },

    agents-api/src/domains/manage/routes/apiKeys.ts (lines 179-203)

    try {
      const result = await createApiKey(runDbClient)(insertData);
      return c.json(
        {
          data: {
            apiKey: {
              ...sanitizedApiKey,
              lastUsedAt: sanitizedApiKey.lastUsedAt ?? null,
              expiresAt: sanitizedApiKey.expiresAt ?? null,
            },
            key: key,
          },
        },
        201
      );
    } catch (error) {
      if (isForeignKeyViolation(error)) {
        throw createApiError({
          code: 'bad_request',
          message: 'Invalid agentId - agent does not exist',
        });
      }
  • Why this is likely a bug: Production code depends on FK-driven rejection for invalid agentId, but no corresponding FK constraint exists on the table, allowing invalid references to be created.

  • Introduced by this PR: No - pre-existing bug (the relevant validation/constraint gap was not introduced by this PR).

FK violation messaging for sub-agent tool relation – Failed
  • Where: Manage sub-agent tool relation creation endpoint (POST /manage/tenants/{tenantId}/projects/{projectId}/agents/{agentId}/sub-agent-tool-relations).

  • Steps to reproduce: Submit relation creation with fake subAgentId and/or toolId values under a valid scope.

  • What failed: The endpoint returned 500 Internal Server Error and leaked SQL query text/params instead of returning a deterministic sanitized bad_request for invalid FK inputs.

  • Code analysis: The route maps errors to bad_request only when isForeignKeyViolation(error) matches, but SQLSTATE extraction checks only error.cause.code or error.code. Unmatched DB error shapes fall through to generic internal error handling, which includes raw error.message in API detail.

  • Relevant code:

    agents-api/src/domains/manage/routes/subAgentToolRelations.ts (lines 251-265)

    try {
      const agentToolRelation = await createAgentToolRelation(db)({
        scopes: { tenantId, projectId, agentId },
        data: body,
      });
      return c.json({ data: agentToolRelation }, 201);
    } catch (error) {
      if (isForeignKeyViolation(error)) {
        throw createApiError({
          code: 'bad_request',
          message: 'Invalid subAgent ID or tool ID - referenced entity does not exist',
        });
      }
      throw error;
    }

    packages/agents-core/src/retry/retryable-errors.ts (lines 51-67)

    export function getPostgresErrorCode(error: unknown): string | undefined {
      if (!error || typeof error !== 'object') return undefined;
      const err = error as Record<string, any>;
    
      if (
        err.cause?.code &&
        typeof err.cause.code === 'string' &&
        SQLSTATE_PATTERN.test(err.cause.code)
      ) {
        return err.cause.code;
      }
    
      if (err.code && typeof err.code === 'string' && SQLSTATE_PATTERN.test(err.code)) {
        return err.code;
      }

    packages/agents-core/src/utils/error.ts (lines 197-207)

    const sanitizedErrorMessage =
      error instanceof Error
        ? error.message.replace(/\b(password|token|key|secret|auth)\b/gi, '[REDACTED]')
        : 'Unknown error';
    
    const problemDetails: ProblemDetails & { error: { code: ErrorCodes; message: string } } = {
      title: 'Internal Server Error',
      status: 500,
      detail: `Server error occurred: ${sanitizedErrorMessage}`,
      code: 'internal_server_error',
  • Why this is likely a bug: Invalid foreign-key inputs should deterministically produce sanitized client errors, but current error-classification and fallback formatting can leak SQL internals via a 500 response path.

  • Introduced by this PR: Unknown - unable to determine.

  • Timestamp: 9:04

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