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FAQ
Short answers with a link to the record that holds the long one.
No. reBot-DevArm is research and education hardware. As inherited it has no emergency stop in its documented design, no supply disconnect or fuse, no watchdog between the host and the actuators, no declared joint limits and no force measurement; its only stop is a software command on the motor bus. The fork's record exists to change that in the open, starting with the gap assessment. No safety function reaches any Performance Level today, no assessment has taken place, and nothing is approved for operation with a person in reach. For the assessor says what an assessment would involve.
Not yet, and the project does not claim it is. The fork has changed no hardware and no code; what it adds today is the record: the concept-phase package, the gap assessment, the strategy, the plans, the register and the process model. The first engineering change will be bench safety hardware on any arm the fork powers: the lead chose a wired stop chain (DQ-006), and its design is the next piece of work.
Because a robot arm on a bench is machinery under Regulation (EU) 2023/1230, and an industrial robot under ISO 10218, not a road vehicle. The standards are ISO 12100, ISO 10218-1/-2, ISO/TS 15066, ISO 13849-1, EN 60204-1, IEC 62443 and ISO/IEC TR 5469. How we use each standard has the mapping.
ISO 13849-1's measure of how reliably a safety function performs, PL a to PL e. ISO 10218-1 expects PL d, category 3, for the emergency stop and the protective stop of an industrial robot, and the package's risk graph lands most contact hazards on d or e. The lead set PL d as the target for the stop functions and PL c for the limits and diagnostics (DQ-004). See the glossary.
The emergency stop on a hardwired chain: two-channel buttons into a safety relay that drops a contactor on the 24 V motor supply. The safe stop on watchdog, the manual reset, the joint, torque and speed limits and the contact detection in a controller safety layer between every command source and the motor bus, where it runs being a decision for the lead (DQ-020). The host stack (the SDK, ROS 2, the policies, the UI) is hardened as defence in depth and carries no Performance Level claim in the first safety case. The argument is in WP-M-01 §6.
Not inside the first safety case. The envelope the lead chose (DQ-003) is a supervised, fixtured bench with nobody but the operator in reach, and no power-and-force-limiting claim is made (DQ-005): the arm has no joint torque sensors and no force or pressure measurement exists (GAP-28). Contact detection by torque estimation is defence in depth, not permission to touch.
The assurance work needs a record that moves at its own pace, with its own baselines, gates and decision authority, and must be free to say what the evidence does not support. Upstream's hardware record is merged, never edited, and the fork is not affiliated with or endorsed by Seeed Studio (WP-M-10). The lead decided to fork the software that moves the arm, the SDK and the ROS 2 driver (DQ-007); the forks are not made yet.
Upstream publishes under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0: the record and any build of it stay non-commercial and share alike. A safety-assured arm placed in a workplace may be commercial use under upstream's own statement, which is one reason the first safety case covers the research bench only (GAP-35, WP-M-13).
On the README, generated from the records in case/ by CI. No number on it is a
safety claim: a claim counts as accepted only when a recorded review accepts it, its evidence is available and
accepted, and no defeater against it is open. Today nothing is accepted and every defeater is open.
The project lead is the safety authority and decides risk acceptance, the required PL, arm behaviour defaults, operating-envelope limits, money, hardware, the assessor, roles and gates. Everything else is a technical choice, recorded so the lead can change it. See how decisions are made.
- A security vulnerability: follow SECURITY.md.
- A hazard, a near miss or an event: the Safety concern issue template.
- Anything else: the Problem report template. See reporting a safety concern.
Drafting is done in Claude Code sessions under the project lead's direction; the working rules are in CLAUDE.md. Every change goes through pull request review and the workflows described in how the repository is organized. The lead holds every safety decision, AI-drafted work counts at independence level I0, and no work product leaves draft without a review by someone else (WP-M-02 §3.3).
Open an issue. Questions that come up more than
once get added to this page by pull request against wiki/.
Mirrored from wiki/ on main at 832f97b, 2026-11-01. Pages are reviewed by pull request; the wiki is not edited in place. This wiki explains and links; safety claims and evidence live in the assurance record.
reBot-DevArm assurance wiki
- Home
- Processes
- Process maps
- Standards at a glance
- How we use each standard
- Standards tour
- Roadmap and status
- How the repository is organized
- How decisions are made
- Glossary
- Reading the safety case
- Hazard scenes
- For the assessor
- Reference arm
- Contributor guide
- Reporting a safety concern
- Session log
- FAQ
The standards tour
- Start here
- ISO 12100
- ISO 10218-1 and -2
- ISO 13849-1 and -2
- IEC 62061
- IEC 61508
- EN 60204-1
- ISO 13850
- ISO 13854
- ISO 13857
- ISO 13855
- ISO/TS 15066
- IEC 60812
- IEC 61025
- ISO 21448
- IEC 62443
- ISO/IEC TR 5469
- UL 4600
- Automotive SPICE
- Machinery Regulation
- AI Act
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