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fix(security): reject file:// URLs that name a host in workspace I/O - #9
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SEC-2 file:// netloc hardening. workspace._workspace_io_path now rejects file:// URLs whose netloc is anything other than a bare drive letter. urlparse puts the drive in netloc for the two-slash form Windows CI builds (file://C:/...), and that is the only netloc we accept. Anything else fails closed with 403 instead of being resolved and tested against a host-layout-dependent allowlist: - file://server/share/x.txt (UNC) would otherwise resolve to the local path /share/x.txt - backslash paths put the whole remainder in netloc and used to collapse to the process cwd Regression tests assert the hostile forms -> 403, and assert that file://C:/... is NOT rejected as a host so the shape Windows actually sends keeps working. Guard only -- the version-sync gate lives in the companion chore/version-sync-gate PR.
On Windows, file://C:/Users/... passes _safe_io_path and the backend containment check raises PermissionError, which read_file did not catch (500). Map it like download_file/read_doc. The bare-drive test now asserts the host rejection did not fire (message check) instead of status != 403, because the outcome is platform-dependent: 404 on Linux, 404 via the containment layer on Windows.
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SEC-2 file:// netloc hardening at the HTTP surface.
workspace._workspace_io_pathnow rejectsfile://URLs whose netloc isanything other than a bare drive letter — a UNC host
(
file://server/share/x) or a backslash path (file://C:\\Users\\x) failsclosed with 403 instead of being resolved and containment-tested against a
host-layout-dependent allowlist.
Exploitability check on the shipped 1.0.2b7+ra.1:
/share/x(no drive): the existing allowlist alreadydenies it, so this half is defense in depth.
resolves to
.(the server process cwd). That is a host-absoluteinterpretation of a user-controlled query parameter landing on the server
working directory: exploitable, not defense in depth. That drives the
+ra.2 hotfix.
Tests: hostile host forms assert 403;
file://C:/...(the two-slash shapeWindows CI builds, where urlparse puts the drive in netloc) asserts it is
NOT rejected as a host.
Companion PR:
chore/version-sync-gate(release version-sync test + Makefileforce-run + publish SKILL fork note). This PR is the security half only.