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FedRAMP 20x Class C: every applicable rule Implemented or Not Applicable - #501
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…n is shown data/frr-records.json holds a record for each of the 154 FedRAMP rules that apply to a 20x Program Class C provider, derived from the pinned corpus's own subset applicability metadata (scripts/_rules.applicable_provider_rules). scripts/_frr.py fails closed on a missing or extra record, an Implemented record without evidence, evidence that does not resolve (test, workflow step, freshness-governed artifact, in-force decision), a non-MAY rule left optional, or published text carrying an account ID or a foreign email. Records are AI-drafted from the 2026-11-05 assessment, corrected for W0/W1 and #496, for the operator's review. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A MAY record now requires may_rationale and any other record refuses it; the text is screened like the rest. The two quarterly-review MAY rules the operator intends to exercise move from optional to W4. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A record may be Not Applicable, with its reason, only for a MAY permission not exercised or a rule in a subset FedRAMP scopes to a step the provider is not taking: Marketplace listing (MKT-CSO) and applying (FRC-APP). A test checks that scoping phrase is FedRAMP's own subset description. "optional" is no longer a closer. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ence-only history, period activity VER-RPT-VDT: carry the historical rating and rating history (providerExtensions; the schema has no field), take the next reduction from a decision's new planned_reduction before the remediation deadline, populate supplementary information from the decision, explain overdue status rather than the suppression, and date a record from a decision that names it (the manual ZAP scans behind DEC-039/040). VER-RPT-AVI: a .checkov.yaml suppression resolves to the resources its decision names, so its IRV is decided from the inventory; suppressed checks are dated by their decision. VER-TFR-MRH: a record that leaves the VDR is Remediated only from evidence (a closed decision, a false-positive suppression, or its scanner running again); otherwise it is recorded as no longer reported with the reason and no final disposition. Closed decisions are backfilled. VER-RPT-PER: each VDT/AVI carries an activity summary for its period, including scans with times and the runtime V&V run, linked. Ratings, deadlines, overdue status and blocking are unchanged on the live inputs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…mulated counterparties flagged
scripts/_frr.py --complete fails the unit-test job (which the deploy job
needs) while any record is Partially or Not Implemented. A record relying on
a simulated outside party carries simulated {counterparty, how}, allowed only
on Implemented records with deploy-time evidence. Known-bad cases and tests
for each invariant.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ed rules The vendored ksi-catalog.json predated FedRAMP's 2026-10-13 mapping revision: 40 of 46 KSIs mapped fewer (or different) controls than the pinned Consolidated Rules. scripts/sync-ksi-catalog.py now derives the KSI block from the pinned rules (Class C statements where a KSI varies by class, titles from the NIST Rev5 catalog), and a test fails while they differ. Within the Moderate baseline no implementation status changes; SC-45 and SC-45.1 become shared. The projection reaches 59 controls beyond Moderate (was 10). s3.rego drops si-12, which no KSI maps any more. The SSP parity test runs on the catalog as it stood at the SSP's retirement. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every applicable 20x Class C rule, every KSI and every Rev5 Moderate control, each no stronger than what backs it; semver versioning; consumers moved to the schema shape. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…eploy SDR-CSO-MTD Implemented; SDR-CSO-FRR, SDR-CSX-KSI, FRC-CSX-VVK and FRC-CSX-VVR gaps restated for the post-deploy state. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…notifications and deadline checks Every change now carries an explicit significant-change evaluation (SCN-Type, SCN-Rationale, and SCN-Record for adaptive/transformative/emergency); a missing tag fails instead of defaulting to routine-recurring, and class-change blocks. The deploy appends every merged evaluation to a signed, append-only log and publishes every register row in FedRAMP's SCN schema with a Markdown view and an Atom feed, listed in the CPO. Business-day deadlines (US federal holidays) are read from the vendored rules; a scheduled workflow fails on anything overdue. Notification is publication only; nothing is sent. SCN-Type: not-significant SCN-Rationale: change-management process and compliance reporting only; no component, boundary, data flow or access change to the system. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ard) SCN-Type: not-significant SCN-Rationale: input validation in the new SCN log builder; no system component, boundary or access change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…torical notices The record describes the system after a successful deploy of this commit: the deploy builds and publishes every notice (any failure fails the deploy; the round-trip check compares the served index and feed), so the mechanism is in force. SCN-2026-001..005 were published after their deadlines and are named. SCN-Type: not-significant SCN-Rationale: rule-record text and a test only; no component, boundary, data flow or access change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…/NRI triggers - data/incidents.json + schema + fail-closed loader (scripts/_incidents.py): every incident carries its FedRAMP reportability evaluation and reason; default N5 until an IEC-CSO-EFI estimate (checked against the rule's rubric). - scripts/build-incident-report.py renders Initial/Ongoing/Final reports in FedRAMP's incident report schema (validated before write) and the incident log; Class C clocks and the rating scale are read from the pinned rules. - policies/triage.rego incident_triggers: VER-TFR-IRI and VER-TFR-NRI, with thresholds parsed from the rule text (fail closed on a changed text). - Reconciliation invariant (m): an open incident's findings are in the VDR. - incident-reports.yml publishes unattended (publish-only; nothing is sent); bootstrap role scoped to .well-known/incident-*; the deploy also publishes; watchdog metric and alarm for overdue reports; freshness entry. - Dated exercise (2026-11-05, exercise: true): IIR -> 2x OIR -> FIR, plus a not-reportable evaluation; run end to end in tests. - FRR records: EFR, DPR, EFI, VER-TFR-IRI, VER-TFR-NRI Implemented; IIR, OIR, FIR, AIR Partially Implemented (publish-only; bootstrap apply pending). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…s state the deployed system The deploy fails before applying anything unless AWS_INCIDENT_REPORTS_ROLE_ARN names the bootstrap incident-reports role and the incident-reports environment deploys only from main (scripts/check-incident-publisher.py; known-bad fixture with the variable missing). After the deploy job, the deploy calls incident-reports.yml (now also workflow_call) on its own role, passing only the CloudFront secret, so a green deploy proves the publisher publishes. IEC-CSO-IIR/OIR/FIR/AIR gaps now state only what holds after a successful deploy: published, not delivered to FedRAMP or agencies, by the operator's decision. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The inbox is simulated for this proof of concept by the operator's decision:
nothing is received or sent. scripts/_fsi.py is the inbox logic
(classification, designators, Class C deadline, register, header-safe
acknowledgement sent once, paging). Every deploy runs it over committed
synthetic messages before the SDR build, fails on any unexpected outcome, and
publishes the signed, dated result as fedramp-inbox-simulation.json, labelled
as a simulation. The published contact says so and points to LinkedIn; the
AFC-CSO-NOC check applies to that contact. AFC records are Implemented with
simulated {counterparty: mail}.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…e SDR
Every deploy and every unattended publish now "delivers" each incident report
the log lists to a simulated FedRAMP and agency recipient
(scripts/deliver-incident-reports.py): read back, checked against the
published sha256 and FedRAMP's schema, and recorded in the signed delivery log
/.well-known/incident-deliveries.json. Nothing is sent. A failed delivery
stops publication.
The deploy job assumes the incident publisher's role before it builds the SDR
(scripts/check-incident-role.py), so a deploy whose publisher role does not
work stops before publishing records that claim it. The role's trust gains the
reviewer-gated deploy environment (bootstrap apply).
IEC-CSO-IIR/OIR/FIR/AIR are Implemented with simulated {incident-recipient}.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…y; SDR carries it; cited tests must pass Totally Real Assessment Services, LLC (simulated) runs as a reusable workflow before the deploy job, works from the generated assessor guide, re-runs every cited check, and signs one set under its own workflow identity, which infrastructure/keys/assessor-identity.json pins. The SDR build requires and verifies the set. The unit-test job fails when a test cited as rule evidence did not pass (FRC-CSX-VVR). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ds in allocated blocks Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ds in allocated blocks Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ence-only history, period activity VER-RPT-VDT: carry the historical rating and rating history (providerExtensions; the schema has no field), take the next reduction from a decision's new planned_reduction before the remediation deadline, populate supplementary information from the decision, explain overdue status rather than the suppression, and date a record from a decision that names it (the manual ZAP scans behind DEC-039/040). VER-RPT-AVI: a .checkov.yaml suppression resolves to the resources its decision names, so its IRV is decided from the inventory; suppressed checks are dated by their decision. VER-TFR-MRH: a record that leaves the VDR is Remediated only from evidence (a closed decision, a false-positive suppression, or its scanner running again); otherwise it is recorded as no longer reported with the reason and no final disposition. Closed decisions are backfilled. VER-RPT-PER: each VDT/AVI carries an activity summary for its period, including scans with times and the runtime V&V run, linked. Ratings, deadlines, overdue status and blocking are unchanged on the live inputs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
… dates for DEC-007/009/010 from git history The CKV_AWS_117 skip is global, so DEC-010 covers every Lambda function; it named a resource no inventory component carries. The inline skips for CKV_AWS_68, CKV_AWS_86/310 and CKV_AWS_117 were added on 2025-06-14 (commit f453e9d), so each was detected by then. AI-drafted for the operator to confirm. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…VDT (VDR-CSO-AKE, VDR-TFR-KEV) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…d disclosure per finding
policies/triage.rego:
- N0 for a fully mitigated finding, read from VER-EVA-EPA's scale (VER-EVA-EPA;
REQ-PAI-1). N0 has no timeframe.
- Groups (VER-EVA-GRV): a finding's group (CVE, else decision, else check) is
evaluated at its most exposed open member, on the clock of its earliest
member; the group's deadline binds every open member (known-bad fixture: a
new instance of an old group is past the group's deadline and blocks).
- VER-TFR-MAV "will not be": a decision's planned remediation past day 192
accepts the finding now (accepted_basis).
- VER-TFR-EVU: evaluation_late when first evaluated more than the rules'
window after detection, or still on a default after it.
scripts/_evaluation.py: the evaluation record per finding (criticality,
reachability, exploitability, detectability, prevalence, privilege, proximate
findings, known threats, automatable, exploitation); the disclosure
determination and the redaction it drives (VER-RPT-NID/RPD). A decision record
may carry automatable {value, evidence}; 'no' without evidence is refused.
The golden triage report is regenerated: the only changed values are the three
fully mitigated findings (N1 -> N0); every other change is an added field.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…oy (MAS-CSO-IIR/FLO/MDI/TPR, FRC-CSX-MAS) - Inventory: the app's browser origins (jsDelivr, Google Cloud Storage) and the VDR's remaining feeds (FIRST EPSS, Grype database) become external services; the CloudTrail trail joins the logging KSIs' evidence domain. - scripts/build-mas.py publishes /.well-known/minimum-assessment-scope.json (+ .md, signed, freshness-governed): information resources, every CSP off-origin host placed or out of scope with a reason, flows with a high-water-mark security category, a metadata inventory, the third-party records with FedRAMP's four fields, and the KSI-to-scope application. It fails the deploy, before the SDR, on any gap. - Classification: 17 new flows covering every external service and data store; an app-delivery group (and its service in the service model). - Third-party records: the four MAS-CSO-TPR fields on all 11; decision fields AI-drafted for the operator to confirm; a decided record without them fails. - scripts/_tpr.py: the CPO's thirdPartyInformationResources, for the CPO hook. - Five rule records flip to Implemented with resolving evidence. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
providerExtensions.fedRampId, read from data/cds/offering.json fedramp_id (the field _offering.fedramp_id() reads on feat/sdr-schema). A missing ID stops the build. Adding these files to check-fedramp-id.py's list is left for integration. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ng standard; DEC-165..167 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Assessor binding (IVV-CSO-FIA, IVV-CSX-AIA, IVV-CSO-ICP, SDR-CSO-FRR): each simulated assessment set names the commit and KSI signal it covered; _assessor.load_assessment refuses any other. The deploy reads the live signal itself before the SDR is built, and the SDR states what the pre-deploy assessment covered. A post-deploy assessment of the just-published state runs after publish and fails the run on any failure. - Append-only histories: the access summary, certification report index and submission log are fetched fail-closed (only a 404 starts a history). - CDS-CSO-FRC: the simulated FedRAMP issues a stand-in report only in response to a submission (first, after an adaptive or transformative SCN, annually), logged with its received date; publication past 2 weeks fails the deploy. Reports say NOT ISSUED BY FEDRAMP and not certified; the CPO states certification.status "not certified (proof of concept)". - AFC-CSO-NOC: the deploy files inbox-change notices with the simulated FedRAMP (log entries only) and fails unless each is within one business day. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ource
The SDR's providerExtensions.certification becomes {program, status}, read
with the CPO's from scripts/_offering.py; the trust center JSON carries the
same and its page reads it. submit-package.py refuses an SDR or CPO without
the status.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Bind assessments to what they covered; enforce append-only histories, CDS-CSO-FRC and AFC-CSO-NOC
Removes the operator log review from DEC-181 and the VDR-CSO-RES record (operator's direction, 2026-11-06: no recurring manual work). The before text is kept under source.reworded. New screen: no in-force decision or rule record commits the operator to a manual review, with a known-bad fixture. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…n the guide - simulated-assessor.yml: the assess job verifies every bundle with cosign (assess.py cosign_verify) but no longer installed it after the signing split; install it (verify only, no id-token). New test: every job that runs cosign installs it first, with a known-bad workflow fixture. - secure-configuration.json 2.3.0: the incident reports role's recommended trust adds the prod environment the bootstrap already grants for the deploy's role check; the exact-set comparison would have failed the deploy. New test: the guide's trust for the maintenance and incident roles equals the bootstrap Terraform's, with a known-bad case. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…le text - deploy-with-opa.yml: the OCR, SDR and CPO previous copies (version, KSI metric and training history) are fetched with fetch-published-history.py: a 404 starts the history, any other failure stops the deploy. Wiring test extended. - notify also watches the unit tests (which hold the rule-completeness gate) and the security scan on main, where their failure skips the deploy rather than failing it; on a pull request their failure is the PR's own check. - DEC-025: the hardware-key purchase plan is withdrawn (DEC-150 accepts virtual TOTP), kept under source.plan_withdrawn, so the OCR stops publishing it as a planned change. Test added. - Text that contradicted the records: continuous-monitoring-plan (the Quarterly Review and feedback rules run with simulated parties, not N/A), rules-of-behavior (changes reach main through pull requests), VDR-CSO-DET / VDR-TFR-PCD (non-machine resources verified every deploy and night), CLAUDE.md invariant (h), DEC-026's POAM-025 citation, the incident-response AWS credential step (CI holds no keys), README script count and the exact cosign identity, a workflow comment citing DEC-191. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The trust manifest and the CDS-TRC-HMR / CDS-CSO-CBF records said every published JSON has a .view.md. Per-incident reports, certification reports and the inventory schema (deploy), the frozen issue, snapshot and Quarterly Review files (package maintainer) and per-incident reports (incident publisher) had none, and the manifest listed views only from the deploy's own folder. Each publisher now builds, gates and puts the view of every JSON or CSV it puts; the manifest lists views from the publisher table in scripts/_signers.py and fails if a JSON is built without its view. The two maintainer-only indexes take the nightly (scheduled unattended) cadence. A test runs each workflow's view, gate and publish steps with stubbed AWS and fails on any JSON put without its view; known-bad fixture included. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The notice deadline ran from the history entry's `since`, and a failed deploy publishes nothing, so each later deploy filed later and the append-only history could not be corrected: a permanent block. A change now takes effect when a deploy first publishes it. The submission log records that deploy (inboxContact: date and commit), each notice carries it (publishedOn, publishedIn), and the deploy fails only when a notice was filed more than one business day after the publishing deploy. Regression test (a change first deployed ten business days after its date passes) and a known-bad notice filed two business days after its publishing deploy. Record and runbook text updated (AI-drafted). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
scripts/check-published-redaction.py now fails any published JSON, CSV or Markdown that carries an email address not at samaydlette.com (or a subdomain), counting without printing the address. Domain labels must start with a letter, so package versions and workflow refs are not read as addresses. Known-bad fixture with an example.com address. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The package submission log, the certification report index, the inbox simulation, the incident delivery log, the incident log, every incident report (providerExtensions.engagement, allowed by FedRAMP's schema) and the SCN index now carry the no-engagement statement verbatim. The simulated certification reports themselves are left as issued: each is published byte-identical to the logged copy, so the statement goes on the index and the log. A test builds each output and fails if one lacks it; known-bad fixture included. The delivery known-bad fixture's report hash follows the changed report bytes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
tools/boundary-map/corroborate_checks.py expected the deploy identity for every deploy-cadence file and the evidence nightly's for every nightly one, so files the package maintainer, the incident publisher or the simulated assessor sign were reported as signed by an unexpected identity. Each file's allowed identities now come from scripts/_signers.py (held to the publish steps by tests/test_publishers.py); the TAP-side verifier tries each allowed identity. Known-bad fixture: two files signed by workflows that never write them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The register row and the impact analysis list the further engine changes (DEC-181 automated sources and the manual-work screen, fail-closed package history, failure alerts on tests and security scan, complete views from every publisher, the email gate, the DEC-194 statement on simulated outputs, writer-based corroboration) and the AFC-CSO-NOC clock now running from the publishing deploy. AI-drafted. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
DEC-181 automated sources, first-deploy blockers, and final-review fixes (views, NOC clock, email gate, DEC-194 outputs)
Every nightly reads CloudTrail write events and GitHub changes to main, workflows, rulesets and environments, evaluates each against what the pipeline is expected to do, and records unexpected events as process findings. A planted, plainly simulated intruder event must be caught on every run. The nightly role gains a read-only LookupEvents grant (bootstrap apply), compared by the secure-configuration check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Annual Security Review (with the rules-of-behavior acknowledgement) and the monthly recovery exercise (annual tabletop in November) are built by scripts with a simulated cast; an overdue check fails the run from the day after a due date with no review published. Recurring costs are AI-drafted estimates for the operator to correct. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Wires the audit-log review, recovery exercises and security reviews into the nightly and maintainer workflows: signer identities, freshness, FedRAMP ID and redaction gates, views, bootstrap object keys, published verification, and VDR monthly activities generated from run records. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
build-sdr.py replaces the KSI-CED-RAT special case with a KSI-to-method table: the training checks, plus the audit-log review (MLA-RVL, CMT-RVP), the Annual Security Review (PIY-RIS, PIY-RES, SVC-EIS, INR-RPI) and the recovery exercise (RPL-TRC), each counted only when its published record's signature verifies against its publisher and the record is current and passing. The deploy and the maintainer rebuild pass the records in. Tests with committed known-bad fixtures cover the planted intruder, an unknown principal, a direct push, a restore mismatch, a configuration gap, a tabletop gap, an unnamed new component type, invalid cost lines, the overdue and acknowledgement checks, the nightly read grant, and parity of the monthly VDR report with its previous output. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
DEC-195 names the only recurring acts left to the operator (the monthly boundary corroboration, decision review_by lapses, deploy approvals and the 30-day deploy freshness windows) and the mechanisms that replace every other recurring review. DEC-019 (formerly POAM-019) is restated as rotate-on-compromise; DEC-032, DEC-166 and DEC-180 name their mechanisms. Each rewording keeps its before-text under source.reworded. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Policies, plans, procedures, the control statements, the VDR suppression rationales and the data records now name the script or workflow that performs each review instead of committing a person to it. Hand-written entries are kept under sections headed as history. AI-drafted. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
scripts/_nonmachine.manual_work screens every sentence for a person, a review-like act and a recurring cadence (or a review-cadence line); the non-machine verification runs it on every listed document, and tests/test_no_manual_work.py runs it over docs/, the README, in-force decisions, rule records, control statements, VDR rationales and data records. Only sentences citing DEC-195 and sections headed as history are allowed. Known-bad fixtures cover the active and passive forms. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds the nightly audit-log review, the monthly recovery exercise, the Annual Security Review, the overdue check, the SDR method counting and the manual-work gate to the register row and the security impact analysis, with the nightly role's read-only LookupEvents grant. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Automate the recurring reviews (DEC-195)
The operator's rule for record statuses: Implemented, Simulated, Not Demonstrated, Not Applicable; stand-ins only when a bad input changes the result and a real input could replace it; stand-ins and scope cuts are proposed, never self-approved; never choose a status because a gate requires it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
CLAUDE.md: proof-of-concept latitude
sam-aydlette
marked this pull request as draft
November 7, 2026 20:56
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Closed without merging. The work is kept locally and will land on main in smaller slices, each deployed and verified. |
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SCN-Type: adaptive
SCN-Rationale: carries the rule-completeness change to main: two IAM roles for unattended publishing, runtime-emitter grants, CloudFront access logging and a DAST scanner user; no new external service, no federal data, no class change.
SCN-Record: SCN-2026-007
This is the one pull request to
mainfor the FedRAMP 20x Class C rule work. It carries the rule register and its deploy gate, plus everything merged intofeat/frr-records:Each of those PRs describes its own changes, verification and residuals.
Changed
data/frr-records.json: one record per applicable 20x Class C provider rule (154), derived from the pinned corpus byscripts/_rules.applicable_provider_rules().scripts/_frr.pyvalidates it and fails closed on:/.well-known/artifact, or an in-forceDEC-NNN);may_rationale;scripts/_frr.py --completeruns in the unit-test job, which the deploy job needs. It fails while any record is Partially or Not Implemented, so nothing deploys with a gap.make check-completeruns it locally.simulated{counterparty, how}: a record that relies on a simulated outside party (assessor, FedRAMP, agency, incident recipient, mail, SAM.gov) says so. It is allowed only on Implemented records with deploy-time evidence, and the SDR publishes the count. Nothing is sent to FedRAMP or anyone.Effect
Rule records, from
python3 scripts/_frr.py:mainVerified
--completegate among them), OPA compliance, Checkov, the security scan, CodeQL with no open alerts, andscn-tag.feat/frr-records:make checkpasses (1847 tests, 1 skipped);make check-completeexits 0; Regal,check-policy-annotations,check-exceptionsandcheck-wasm-safepass.Residual
deploy-staging/<sha>/in the website bucket and may be served by the CDN until deleted. They hold the same redacted content the deploy publishes.Needs human
SILK_DAST_*secrets and the labels. The deploy's header, logging and availability checks fail until they are done.main, dispatch a ZAP run, wait for the first availability-probe run, then approve the deploy.Couldn't verify
verify-published.shand storycheck run against the live site after the deploy.🤖 Generated with Claude Code