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Integration: all groups combined; every rule Implemented or N/A - #510
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…ence-only history, period activity VER-RPT-VDT: carry the historical rating and rating history (providerExtensions; the schema has no field), take the next reduction from a decision's new planned_reduction before the remediation deadline, populate supplementary information from the decision, explain overdue status rather than the suppression, and date a record from a decision that names it (the manual ZAP scans behind DEC-039/040). VER-RPT-AVI: a .checkov.yaml suppression resolves to the resources its decision names, so its IRV is decided from the inventory; suppressed checks are dated by their decision. VER-TFR-MRH: a record that leaves the VDR is Remediated only from evidence (a closed decision, a false-positive suppression, or its scanner running again); otherwise it is recorded as no longer reported with the reason and no final disposition. Closed decisions are backfilled. VER-RPT-PER: each VDT/AVI carries an activity summary for its period, including scans with times and the runtime V&V run, linked. Ratings, deadlines, overdue status and blocking are unchanged on the live inputs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ed rules The vendored ksi-catalog.json predated FedRAMP's 2026-10-13 mapping revision: 40 of 46 KSIs mapped fewer (or different) controls than the pinned Consolidated Rules. scripts/sync-ksi-catalog.py now derives the KSI block from the pinned rules (Class C statements where a KSI varies by class, titles from the NIST Rev5 catalog), and a test fails while they differ. Within the Moderate baseline no implementation status changes; SC-45 and SC-45.1 become shared. The projection reaches 59 controls beyond Moderate (was 10). s3.rego drops si-12, which no KSI maps any more. The SSP parity test runs on the catalog as it stood at the SSP's retirement. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every applicable 20x Class C rule, every KSI and every Rev5 Moderate control, each no stronger than what backs it; semver versioning; consumers moved to the schema shape. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…eploy SDR-CSO-MTD Implemented; SDR-CSO-FRR, SDR-CSX-KSI, FRC-CSX-VVK and FRC-CSX-VVR gaps restated for the post-deploy state. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…notifications and deadline checks Every change now carries an explicit significant-change evaluation (SCN-Type, SCN-Rationale, and SCN-Record for adaptive/transformative/emergency); a missing tag fails instead of defaulting to routine-recurring, and class-change blocks. The deploy appends every merged evaluation to a signed, append-only log and publishes every register row in FedRAMP's SCN schema with a Markdown view and an Atom feed, listed in the CPO. Business-day deadlines (US federal holidays) are read from the vendored rules; a scheduled workflow fails on anything overdue. Notification is publication only; nothing is sent. SCN-Type: not-significant SCN-Rationale: change-management process and compliance reporting only; no component, boundary, data flow or access change to the system. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ard) SCN-Type: not-significant SCN-Rationale: input validation in the new SCN log builder; no system component, boundary or access change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…torical notices The record describes the system after a successful deploy of this commit: the deploy builds and publishes every notice (any failure fails the deploy; the round-trip check compares the served index and feed), so the mechanism is in force. SCN-2026-001..005 were published after their deadlines and are named. SCN-Type: not-significant SCN-Rationale: rule-record text and a test only; no component, boundary, data flow or access change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…/NRI triggers - data/incidents.json + schema + fail-closed loader (scripts/_incidents.py): every incident carries its FedRAMP reportability evaluation and reason; default N5 until an IEC-CSO-EFI estimate (checked against the rule's rubric). - scripts/build-incident-report.py renders Initial/Ongoing/Final reports in FedRAMP's incident report schema (validated before write) and the incident log; Class C clocks and the rating scale are read from the pinned rules. - policies/triage.rego incident_triggers: VER-TFR-IRI and VER-TFR-NRI, with thresholds parsed from the rule text (fail closed on a changed text). - Reconciliation invariant (m): an open incident's findings are in the VDR. - incident-reports.yml publishes unattended (publish-only; nothing is sent); bootstrap role scoped to .well-known/incident-*; the deploy also publishes; watchdog metric and alarm for overdue reports; freshness entry. - Dated exercise (2026-11-05, exercise: true): IIR -> 2x OIR -> FIR, plus a not-reportable evaluation; run end to end in tests. - FRR records: EFR, DPR, EFI, VER-TFR-IRI, VER-TFR-NRI Implemented; IIR, OIR, FIR, AIR Partially Implemented (publish-only; bootstrap apply pending). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…s state the deployed system The deploy fails before applying anything unless AWS_INCIDENT_REPORTS_ROLE_ARN names the bootstrap incident-reports role and the incident-reports environment deploys only from main (scripts/check-incident-publisher.py; known-bad fixture with the variable missing). After the deploy job, the deploy calls incident-reports.yml (now also workflow_call) on its own role, passing only the CloudFront secret, so a green deploy proves the publisher publishes. IEC-CSO-IIR/OIR/FIR/AIR gaps now state only what holds after a successful deploy: published, not delivered to FedRAMP or agencies, by the operator's decision. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The inbox is simulated for this proof of concept by the operator's decision:
nothing is received or sent. scripts/_fsi.py is the inbox logic
(classification, designators, Class C deadline, register, header-safe
acknowledgement sent once, paging). Every deploy runs it over committed
synthetic messages before the SDR build, fails on any unexpected outcome, and
publishes the signed, dated result as fedramp-inbox-simulation.json, labelled
as a simulation. The published contact says so and points to LinkedIn; the
AFC-CSO-NOC check applies to that contact. AFC records are Implemented with
simulated {counterparty: mail}.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…e SDR
Every deploy and every unattended publish now "delivers" each incident report
the log lists to a simulated FedRAMP and agency recipient
(scripts/deliver-incident-reports.py): read back, checked against the
published sha256 and FedRAMP's schema, and recorded in the signed delivery log
/.well-known/incident-deliveries.json. Nothing is sent. A failed delivery
stops publication.
The deploy job assumes the incident publisher's role before it builds the SDR
(scripts/check-incident-role.py), so a deploy whose publisher role does not
work stops before publishing records that claim it. The role's trust gains the
reviewer-gated deploy environment (bootstrap apply).
IEC-CSO-IIR/OIR/FIR/AIR are Implemented with simulated {incident-recipient}.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…y; SDR carries it; cited tests must pass Totally Real Assessment Services, LLC (simulated) runs as a reusable workflow before the deploy job, works from the generated assessor guide, re-runs every cited check, and signs one set under its own workflow identity, which infrastructure/keys/assessor-identity.json pins. The SDR build requires and verifies the set. The unit-test job fails when a test cited as rule evidence did not pass (FRC-CSX-VVR). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ds in allocated blocks Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ence-only history, period activity VER-RPT-VDT: carry the historical rating and rating history (providerExtensions; the schema has no field), take the next reduction from a decision's new planned_reduction before the remediation deadline, populate supplementary information from the decision, explain overdue status rather than the suppression, and date a record from a decision that names it (the manual ZAP scans behind DEC-039/040). VER-RPT-AVI: a .checkov.yaml suppression resolves to the resources its decision names, so its IRV is decided from the inventory; suppressed checks are dated by their decision. VER-TFR-MRH: a record that leaves the VDR is Remediated only from evidence (a closed decision, a false-positive suppression, or its scanner running again); otherwise it is recorded as no longer reported with the reason and no final disposition. Closed decisions are backfilled. VER-RPT-PER: each VDT/AVI carries an activity summary for its period, including scans with times and the runtime V&V run, linked. Ratings, deadlines, overdue status and blocking are unchanged on the live inputs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
… dates for DEC-007/009/010 from git history The CKV_AWS_117 skip is global, so DEC-010 covers every Lambda function; it named a resource no inventory component carries. The inline skips for CKV_AWS_68, CKV_AWS_86/310 and CKV_AWS_117 were added on 2025-06-14 (commit f453e9d), so each was detected by then. AI-drafted for the operator to confirm. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…VDT (VDR-CSO-AKE, VDR-TFR-KEV) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…d disclosure per finding
policies/triage.rego:
- N0 for a fully mitigated finding, read from VER-EVA-EPA's scale (VER-EVA-EPA;
REQ-PAI-1). N0 has no timeframe.
- Groups (VER-EVA-GRV): a finding's group (CVE, else decision, else check) is
evaluated at its most exposed open member, on the clock of its earliest
member; the group's deadline binds every open member (known-bad fixture: a
new instance of an old group is past the group's deadline and blocks).
- VER-TFR-MAV "will not be": a decision's planned remediation past day 192
accepts the finding now (accepted_basis).
- VER-TFR-EVU: evaluation_late when first evaluated more than the rules'
window after detection, or still on a default after it.
scripts/_evaluation.py: the evaluation record per finding (criticality,
reachability, exploitability, detectability, prevalence, privilege, proximate
findings, known threats, automatable, exploitation); the disclosure
determination and the redaction it drives (VER-RPT-NID/RPD). A decision record
may carry automatable {value, evidence}; 'no' without evidence is refused.
The golden triage report is regenerated: the only changed values are the three
fully mitigated findings (N1 -> N0); every other change is an added field.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…oy (MAS-CSO-IIR/FLO/MDI/TPR, FRC-CSX-MAS) - Inventory: the app's browser origins (jsDelivr, Google Cloud Storage) and the VDR's remaining feeds (FIRST EPSS, Grype database) become external services; the CloudTrail trail joins the logging KSIs' evidence domain. - scripts/build-mas.py publishes /.well-known/minimum-assessment-scope.json (+ .md, signed, freshness-governed): information resources, every CSP off-origin host placed or out of scope with a reason, flows with a high-water-mark security category, a metadata inventory, the third-party records with FedRAMP's four fields, and the KSI-to-scope application. It fails the deploy, before the SDR, on any gap. - Classification: 17 new flows covering every external service and data store; an app-delivery group (and its service in the service model). - Third-party records: the four MAS-CSO-TPR fields on all 11; decision fields AI-drafted for the operator to confirm; a decided record without them fails. - scripts/_tpr.py: the CPO's thirdPartyInformationResources, for the CPO hook. - Five rule records flip to Implemented with resolving evidence. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
providerExtensions.fedRampId, read from data/cds/offering.json fedramp_id (the field _offering.fedramp_id() reads on feat/sdr-schema). A missing ID stops the build. Adding these files to check-fedramp-id.py's list is left for integration. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ng standard; DEC-165..167 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…sclosure (DEC-182) policies The drafted per-check CVSS vectors are adopted by a decision record, and each names it: a decided vector whose record is missing or not in force stops the build (known-bad fixture). Configuration findings now get PAIN from the CVSS-Environmental derivation and LEV from Figure 7 instead of the defaults (VER-EVA-ELX, VER-EVA-EPA). DEC-180..182 are AI-drafted for Sam's confirmation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…, CORS on /.well-known/ - availability-probe.yml + scripts/availability-probe.py: a monitor on GitHub Actions (outside AWS) probes the site, trust center, /.well-known/, the Silk Reeling app and its sign-in every 15 minutes, keeps 35 days, derives incidents, and publishes JSON + Markdown to the availability-status branch; an ongoing incident fails the run. The deploy fails when that feed is missing or stale, and availability.json is now built from it, never from deploys. - CloudFront standard logging v2 (bootstrap/trust-access-logs.tf) with a field allowlist that drops IP, cookies, query string, user agent and referrer; raw records expire after 90 days (logging.tf). The deploy fails unless the delivery exists within the allowlist, and publishes monthly aggregates for /.well-known/ and /trust/ only (access-summary.json, 13 months). - /.well-known/* gets its own response-headers policy with read-only CORS; the deploy checks CORS, JSON Content-Type and nosniff live. - DEC-160 (AI-drafted for the operator): what is logged, and a party's own records on request. - CDS-CSO-AVR, CDS-TRC-USH, CDS-TRC-ACL flip to Implemented. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…er-service crypto modules The Secure Configuration Guide is generated on every deploy from one source (data/secure-configuration.json) and published signed as /.well-known/secure-configuration-guide.json and .md: each top-level and privileged account with how it is named, accessed, configured, operated and decommissioned; each setting with who can operate it, the recommended value, its implication and the API that reads and changes it; a version and release history whose defaults digest the build enforces. It states the system as it is: virtual TOTP MFA on root and the operator user, an accepted finding (DEC-150, extending DEC-025). scripts/check-secure-config.py reads the live settings read-only before the SDR is built, compares them with the guide and publishes the export as /.well-known/security-settings.json; an uncovered deviation or an unreadable setting fails the deploy. The deploy role's reads are a new bootstrap policy (infrastructure/bootstrap/deploy-config-reads.tf), applied by the operator. The guide also carries the cryptographic module per service, joined with the inventory (the build fails on an unmapped component type), citing the KMS HSM's CMVP certificate (#4884) and stating where AWS publishes none (DEC-152). Flips SCG-CSO-AUP/PUB/RSC/SDF, SCG-ENH-API/CMP/EXP/MRG/VRH and CMU-CSO-CMD/UVM/CAT to Implemented. Decision records DEC-150..152 and the guide's text are AI-drafted for the operator to confirm. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ished documents; lossless human views with round-trip check Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
# Conflicts: # data/decisions.json # infrastructure/schemas/freshness-config.json
# Conflicts: # .github/workflows/deploy-with-opa.yml # data/decisions.json # tests/test_decisions.py
…site root resolves to its page VDR-CSO-FAV: a detect-and-recover failure recorded in the run, or a finding still on a default after the VER-TFR-EVU window, becomes a finding with source 'process' (tracking ID, clock, rating, deadline), remediated when the check passes. Runs a block-mode check stopped are listed in the next report's process_failures (workflow and times; no run IDs or URLs), from a new 'Collect failed pipeline runs' step in the deploy and the nightly. VER-EVA-EPA: impact_rationale states the likely agency effect and what it rests on (the decided vector's rationale, the advisory's vector, or the severity default), and the VDT's potentialAgencyImpact carries it. The VDT's providerExtensions carry the evaluation record, group, disclosure and acceptance basis. VER-EVA-EIR: a DAST finding on a site root (https://host) resolves to the root page instead of the fail-safe. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…trust-scope-assessor Conflicts: deploy-with-opa.yml (edge steps kept before group 2's renamed CDS step; the folded-in COP dropped from the trust-scope lists; group 2's report signing and redaction entries kept), offering.json (the SCG fork's module validations in group 2's layout), decisions.json (union by ID), test_frr_records.py (theirs). DEC-150 now names the operators group, not an IAM user, so the new no-IAM-user-name test holds; IRP evidence follows the renamed CDS step. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…es for every machine component type One Rego source now gates the plan and the live account for IAM roles, inline and group policies, the GitHub OIDC provider and trust, the Cognito user pool, KMS keys, the ACM certificate, DNSSEC, log groups, CloudTrail, alarms, schedules, the API stage and routes, Lambda functions and their deployed code package, SNS, SQS and DynamoDB. Rules read Terraform attribute names under values, which the runtime emitter writes from the live APIs; an attribute computed at apply time is deferred to the runtime check, never assumed good. New parameters (OIDC audience and subject prefix, password floor, log retention floor, protected API prefixes, certificate horizon) are governed data in config/data.json and required by the configuration guard. Known-bad plan and runtime fixtures cover each rule family. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…e defers to unread actions The Wasm host has no time builtins, so the certificate rule reads a days_to_expiry the reader computes instead of parsing NotAfter. An alarm whose actions could not be read is reported once, as the read error. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Plan results now become validations of IAM roles and policies, log groups, keys, the user pool, topics, queues, schedules, alarms and the trail, joined by exact plan address first (resource_reports carries it), then by a unique Terraform name; ambiguous names credit nobody. API stages and routes fold into their API. Function components carry the deployed code hash and npm/PyPI components name the function they ship in, for the runtime integrity check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
history.js summarizes each run (signal_id, emitted_at, validations, failed, unassessed, divergence) and carries previous summaries forward only from a signal that verifies against the emitter's own key; otherwise the history restarts and says why. 400 entries, schema-bounded. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…licy describers.js reads IAM roles, policies, groups and the OIDC provider, functions (configuration and deployment-package integrity), log groups, the trail, alarms, schedules, topics, queues, the lock table, the user pool, KMS keys, the HTTP API, the DNS zone and the certificate, and shapes each as the Terraform resource the deploy gate's Rego evaluates. A denied call becomes read_errors (unassessed), never a pass. index.js wires the readers in and publishes run_history inside the signed signal. The lambda_opa role gains read-only Get/Describe/List actions, each scoped by ARN to this system's resources; tag:GetResources is the only action on "*" (no resource-level support). tests/test_runtime_grants.py ties every SDK call to a grant and every grant to a call. Timeout 60s -> 180s. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every machine component of the inventory needs an assessed validation in a verified runtime signal no older than the governed window; every component type must be classified in runtime-vv-config.json, which also records the likely-to-drift set (VDR-TFR-PDD). The nightly reconciliation runs it against the published runtime signal; a missing or unverifiable signal fails it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The VDR build carries the emitter's signed run history (from a verified signal only) in methodology.runtime_verification.run_history; the VDT/AVI activity summary and the monthly report count every run in the period from it, not only the latest. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…orting and detection Implemented; VVK at 43 of 46 KSIs VDR-TFR-MVX, -PDD, -PSD; VER-RPT-PER; VDR-CSO-DET Implemented with their evidence. FRC-CSX-VVK stays Partially Implemented: SCR-MIT and SCR-MON have one automated method and CED-RAT none; closing it needs an SDR counting change or the operator's decision. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…he assessor's summary; FedRAMP ID on the trust-center files Wire group 5's four CPO fields into build-cpo.py, one small function each: serviceProperties.trustCenter, serviceProperties.secureConfigurationGuidance, thirdPartyInformationResources (scripts/_tpr.py) and the simulated assessor's overall summary, quoted verbatim from its verified signed set under providerExtensions.independentAssessment. The CPO refuses to build without the set; the deploy and the daily package maintainer pass it (the maintainer also passes it to the SDR rebuild, which previously dropped the assessor results). The package submission now refuses a CPO missing any of the four (known-bad fixture). Stamp the offering's FedRAMP ID at top level on trust-center.json, trust-manifest.json, availability.json and the independent availability feed, policy-index.json, assessor-guide.json, simulated-assessment.json, agency-access-exercise.json and frr-evidence.json, add them to the gate's REPORTS, make a named site file without one fail (known-bad fixture), and run the gate once the last listed file is built, before publication. Flip CPO-CSO-OSA (simulated assessor), CPO-CSO-OVR, CDS-CSO-PUB (UEI simulated sam-gov), FRC-CSO-JSN and FRC-CSO-PKG (simulated fedramp) to Implemented. CDS-CSO-FID stays Partially Implemented for integration. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Conflicts resolved keeping both sides: - offering.json: the schema-form CPO values, plus the simulated FedRAMP Security Inbox contact (no personal email address is restored). - build-cpo.py: the CPO stays in FedRAMP's schema; the inbox contact and the SCN notification statement move to providerExtensions, and the SCN, incident and inbox artifacts join the package's additional repositories. - build-ocr.py: the schema-form OCR keeps its incident list and gains the validated incident register and the attestation of none. - freshness-config.json: all entries from both sides; the retired CDS overview package stays retired. - boundary-classification.json: the incident publisher flow is renumbered Z. - deploy-with-opa.yml: both preflights, both post-deploy proof jobs, every artifact signed, gated and published; SCN and FRC steps run before the SDR. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Conflicts resolved keeping both sides: - frr-records.json and decisions.json merged record by record: each record from the branch that changed it; FRC-CSX-VVK from the detection work. - triage.rego: the grouped decide (base_decisions plus grouping) with the incident triggers and errors appended after decisions. - reconcile.py: both invariants kept. Incident findings stay (m), as the gate-mode register and the published report name it; runtime V&V coverage becomes (n) and still always blocks. - deploy-with-opa.yml and evidence-nightly.yml: incident reports, the non-machine V&V check and the monthly report all built, signed, gated and published; the nightly rebuilds human-readable views for the two new VDR artifacts. - non-machine-resources.json: the FedRAMP Security Inbox runbook joins the quarterly verification register. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every builder that writes a freshness-governed JSON artifact stamps the offering's FedRAMP ID through _offering.stamp_fedramp_id: in providerExtensions for FedRAMP-schema reports, at the top level for site files. check-fedramp-id.py covers the VDR family, the KSI signal, SCN and incident files, the inbox simulation, MAS, SCG, settings, the access summary, boundary map, reconcile report and conformance, and a test fails when a governed artifact is neither checked nor exempt with a reason. The nightly and the incident publisher run the gate on what they republish. SCN notifications and incident reports are written through write_validated (FRC-CSO-JSN). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
… (FRC-CSX-VVK) build-sdr.py counts a third automated method for a KSI with npm or PyPI components: the bound VDR's signature verifies against the deploy or nightly identity, it is within its window, and every Grype feed passed the detection gate. KSI-CED-RAT counts the operator's training attestation (DEC-192) while it is in force and under a year old. A KSI short of two methods without an in-force accepted decision is a warning in the deploy (which sees the pre-deploy runtime signal) and fails the package maintainer, which runs after the deploy and daily. DEC-191 accepts KSI-CED-RAT's single method. Both decisions are AI-drafted for the operator to confirm. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
aws_iam_group_policy, aws_iam_role_policy_attachment and aws_iam_group_policy_attachment become iam_policy components, one per attachment block however many instances its for_each makes, with attached policies listed by name only. Scanner findings that name these blocks now resolve to a component instead of vdr.unresolved-component. Address resolution prefers an exact resource type before the prefix match, so an attachment named like its group resolves to the attachment. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…SCN and incident JSON CDS-CSO-FID cites the coverage test, its known-bad fixtures and the nightly and incident-publisher gate steps. FRC-CSX-VVK describes the four methods, states that KSI-CED-RAT has one with the accepted finding DEC-191, and cites the SDR tests, the maintainer step and both decisions. FRC-CSO-JSN now cites the SCN and incident schema tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…uard) Keeps the expression out of the shell script body. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…its parser Both merged branches added the option, and argparse refuses a second declaration, so the OCR step would have stopped the deploy. A test runs --help on every argparse script a workflow calls, with a known-bad fixture. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…on gate checks for them The vulnerability history backfills closed decisions with the resources they name, and the trust center and VDR publish decision scopes; the register names IAM users as aws-iam-user::<name>. Each published copy now carries aws-iam-user::NAME-WITHHELD, and check-published-redaction.py fails on any remaining IAM user name, with a known-bad fixture. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ed before publishing
After apply, the deploy stages its signed inventory under
deploy-staging/<sha>/ and invokes the runtime emitter synchronously with
{stage: <sha>}. The emitter accepts only a 40-hex SHA, re-validates the
deployed system against that inventory, and writes its signed signal
beside it (a new PutObject grant on that key only). The deploy reads it
back, deletes the staging objects, and checks it re-validated this
commit. The VDR and SDR use that signal; build-sdr.py --runtime-commit
counts the runtime method only for it, and --require-two-methods fails
the deploy before anything is published. The FRC-CSX-VVK record now
describes the deploy holding the requirement.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
… SDR requires two methods Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
… one The nightly beacon names its run by workflow and commit instead of a run URL; the KSI signal's provenance drops builder.run_id (source.commit and builder.id identify the build); the SLSA provenance omits runDetails.metadata.invocationId, which SLSA v1.0 does not require (BuildMetadata has no required field). check-published-redaction.py fails on a run URL or a numeric run_id, with known-bad fixtures. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
security.txt and the KSI signal's operator_contact named a personal mailbox. Both now point at https://www.linkedin.com/in/sa2/, already linked from every page. A test keeps a personal mailbox out of both. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The operator classed the combined change as adaptive: two unattended IAM roles, new runtime-emitter grants, CloudFront access logging and a DAST scanner user. Adds the register row and the impact analysis (AI-drafted for review). The deadline tests used SCN-2026-007 as an unregistered ID; they now use SCN-2026-098. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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SCN-Type: adaptive
SCN-Rationale: adds two IAM roles for unattended publishing, runtime-emitter grants, CloudFront access logging and a DAST scanner user; no new external service, no federal data, no class change.
SCN-Record: SCN-2026-007
Changed
Merges (plain merges into a branch cut from
feat/frr-records):feat/trust-scope-assessor(#509, which carries #503's schema-shaped package), thenfeat/notifications(#508), thenfeat/vdr-followups(#505).How the conflicts were resolved:
data/cds/offering.json: kept the schema-form values and added the FedRAMP Security Inbox block. The personal email address from the notifications side was not carried over.docs/boundary/boundary-classification.json: kept flows L to Y4 and renumbered the incident-report flow toZ. Added the incident role and policies to the MAS fixture.infrastructure/schemas/freshness-config.json: combined both sides' entries (inbox simulation, SCN JSON, SCN Atom feed, SCN evaluations). The certification overview stays retired.scripts/build-ocr.py:--incidents, so it is now declared once, with a test (below).scripts/build-cpo.py:providerExtensions;additionalRepositories;data/frr-records.jsonanddata/decisions.json: merged record by record, each record taken from the branch that owns it.policies/triage.rego: kept the grouped decisions and added the incident triggers.scripts/reconcile.py: both branches added an invariant(m). Incident findings stay(m), and runtime V&V coverage becomes(n); the three records that cite it were updated.deploy-with-opa.yml,evidence-nightly.yml: kept every step from both sides, including both preflights and both post-deploy jobs, combined the redaction lists, and kept the publish lists equal to the gate. The SCN build and the FRC publish now run before the SDR build.data/non-machine-resources.json: added the FedRAMP Security Inbox runbook (DEC-190).Records closed:
scripts/_offering.stamp_fedramp_idstamps every freshness-governed JSON artifact: inproviderExtensionsfor FedRAMP-schema reports, at the top level for site files;check-fedramp-id.pychecks the VDR family, the KSI signal, the SCN and incident files, the inbox simulation, MAS, SCG, settings, the access summary, the boundary map, the reconcile report and conformance;build-sdr.pycounts dependency scanning for KSIs that have npm or PyPI components, only when the bound VDR is signed by the deploy or nightly identity, fresh, and every Grype feed passed;deploy-staging/<sha>/and invokes the runtime emitter synchronously with{"stage": "<sha>"};main.tf;build-sdr.py --runtime-commitcounts the runtime method only for it, and--require-two-methodsfails the deploy before anything is published;write_validated. The record now cites the schema tests and the known-bad tests (a document that fails is not written).process-vdr.unresolved-component:aws_iam_group_policy,aws_iam_role_policy_attachmentandaws_iam_group_policy_attachmentare now inventory components. An attachment block is one component, with its policies listed by name only.aws_iam_group_policy_attachment.read_onlyresolves to the attachment, not to the group.Operator decisions applied:
security.txtand the KSI signal'soperator_contactpublish the operator's LinkedIn profile instead of a personal email address, with a test.Found during integration:
Duplicate
--incidentsoption: the mergedbuild-ocr.pydeclared it twice, which would have stopped the deploy at the OCR step. A new test runs--helpon every argparse script a workflow calls, with a known-bad fixture.IAM user names: the vulnerability history backfill, the trust-center register and the VDR's suppression scopes published decision resources, including IAM user names (
aws-iam-user::<name>). Published copies now carryaws-iam-user::NAME-WITHHELD, and the publication redaction gate fails on any remaining IAM user name, with a known-bad fixture.GitHub run IDs are no longer published:
run_urlis replaced byrun: {workflow, commit};provenance.builder.run_id;runDetails.metadata.invocationId, which SLSA v1.0 does not require (BuildMetadata has no required field);check-published-redaction.pyfails on a run URL or a numericrun_id, with known-bad fixtures.No consumer read these values. The SLA-alarm runbook now finds the run by workflow and time.
CodeGuard: the SDR step passes the VDR signer identity through
envinstead of interpolating an expression into the script.Effect
After deploy:
automatedMethods,packageComponentsandfewerMethodsAccepted;Rule records, from
python3 scripts/_frr.py:feat/frr-records(base)python3 scripts/_frr.py --completeexits 0: every applicable rule is Implemented or Not Applicable.Verified
make checkpasses: 1834 tests, 1 skipped, plus ruff, OPA tests and coverage.make check-completeexits 0.infrastructure/policy(no violations),check-policy-annotations.py,check-exceptions.py,check-wasm-safe.py.check-published-redaction.pypasses over them.Residual
deploy-staging/<sha>/in the website bucket, so the CDN may serve them while they exist. They hold the same redacted content the deploy is about to publish, and are deleted on exit, whether the step succeeds or fails.*.bundle) and the provenance envelope (*.intoto.jsonl) carry the Fulcio certificate, whose Run Invocation URI extension names the GitHub run. That is part of keyless signing; removing it would mean dropping keyless signing. The publication gate does not scan Sigstore's output.Needs human
In order:
Bootstrap applies (operator, one
terraform applyofinfrastructure/bootstrapfrom a tree synced to this branch):package-maintenance.tf;incident-reports.tf, including the deploy-environment trust;cloudfront.tf(the/.well-known/*response-headers policy and behaviour);trust-access-logs.tf;deploy-config-reads.tf.Repository variables, from the bootstrap outputs:
AWS_PACKAGE_MAINTENANCE_ROLE_ARNfrompackage_maintenance_role_arn;AWS_INCIDENT_REPORTS_ROLE_ARNfromincident_reports_role_arn.GitHub Environments, each with no reviewer and deployment branches restricted to exactly
main:package-maintenance;incident-reports.DAST scanner (see
docs/runbooks/dast-scanner-user.md): create the scanner user and the secretsSILK_DAST_USERNAME,SILK_DAST_PASSWORD,SILK_DAST_USER_POOL_IDandSILK_DAST_TOTP_SECRET.Labels: create
ocr-feedback,quarterly-review-registrationandpackage-maintenance.Account and repository checks:
availability-statusbranch.SCN lines: add them to the descriptions of FedRAMP 20x Class C: every applicable rule Implemented or Not Applicable #501 and of any open Dependabot PRs, or
scn-tagfails.Review the AI-drafted text:
samitems (application, UEI, assessor), the 13 Not Applicable reasons and the MAY rationales;Confirm the AI-drafted decisions:
gate-modesentries (vdr.coverage,vdr.unresolved-component,reconcile.mblock);data/minimum-assessment-scope.json(ext::duo-mfais inferred).Re-decide or amend:
silk_reeling;planned_completioncontradicts DEC-150;decided_by: Operator.Decide:
Within the next weeks:
infrastructure/main.tf;authorization-boundary.html(an article; not edited here).Merge, then deploy:
feat/frr-records, thenmain.The main-stack apply happens in the deploy. It:
Costs, all estimated: CloudFront log delivery under $0.05 a month, API scan traffic under $0.25 a month, one Cognito MAU (free tier). CodeQL, Actions and ZAP are free on a public repo.
Couldn't verify
fedRampIdcopy (checked statically).infrastructure/bootstrap/*.tf.REPORTSchecks their output.🤖 Generated with Claude Code