A collection of formal proofs, derivations, and mathematical constructions in economic theory, checked in Lean 4.
This repository exists partly as a working notebook and partly as an attempt to think more rigorously about systems, abstraction, and structure.
lake build
SomeProofs.lean
SomeProofsTest.lean
SomeProofs/
|- ConsumerTheory/
| `- Basic.lean
|- ProducerTheory/
| `- Basic.lean
|- GameTheory/
| `- Basic.lean
|- GeneralEquilibrium/
| `- Basic.lean
|- DynamicProg/
| `- Basic.lean
|- Mathematics/
| |- Infrastructure.lean
| |- FixedPoint.lean
| `- Convexity.lean
|- Econometrics/
| |- LinearModels.lean
| `- Asymptotics.lean
`- Utils/
|- Notations.lean
|- Tactics.lean
`- Utils.lean
SomeProofsTest/
`- BudgetCompactness.lean
-
budget_set_compact— For strictly positive prices$p \in \mathbb{R}^n$ and$w \ge 0$ , the set${x \ge 0 \mid p \cdot x \le w} \subset \mathbb{R}^n$ is compact. Proved by embedding in a product of compact intervals. (Mas-Colell, Whinston, & Green, 1995, Proposition 2.D.1) -
utility_maximum_attained— A continuous function on a non-empty compact set attains its maximum. Wrapper aroundIsCompact.exists_isMaxOn. (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Theorem M.C.1)
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standardSimplex— Definition of the standard$n$ -simplex$\Delta^n = {x \in \mathbb{R}^{n+1} \mid x \ge 0,\ \sum x_i = 1}$ with proofs of non-emptiness and convexity. -
brouwer_fixed_point_interval— Any continuous$f: [0,1] \to [0,1]$ has a fixed point. Proved by applying the intermediate value theorem to$g(x) = f(x) - x$ . (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Appendix M.I) -
brouwer_fixed_point_simplex— Brouwer fixed point theorem for the standard$n$ -simplex. (Stated — full proof via Sperner's lemma pending.) -
brouwer_fixed_point_bridge— Brouwer fixed point theorem for any non-empty compact convex$C \subset \mathbb{R}^n$ . (Stated.) -
kakutani_fixed_point_bridge— Fixed point theorem for convex-valued, upper hemicontinuous correspondences on compact convex sets. (Stated.)
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envelope_theorem— For a parameterised optimisation problem$V(\theta) = \max_x f(x, \theta)$ , the total derivative equals the partial derivative at the optimum:$V'(\theta) = \partial f / \partial \theta, (x^*(\theta), \theta)$ . (Stated.) (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Appendix M.L) -
kkt_sufficiency— For a concave objective on convex constraints, any point satisfying the KKT first-order conditions is a global maximiser. Signature usesConcaveOn/ConvexOnfrom mathlib. (Stated.) (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Appendix M.K)
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PreferenceRelation— Typeclass providingweak,strict, andindiffbinary relations over a type$\alpha$ . (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Chapter 1.B) -
preference_complete—$\forall x, y,; x \succcurlyeq y \lor y \succcurlyeq x$ . (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Definition 1.B.1) -
preference_transitive—$\forall x, y, z,; (x \succcurlyeq y \land y \succcurlyeq z) \Rightarrow x \succcurlyeq z$ . (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Definition 1.B.1) -
preference_continuous— For every$y$ , the sets${x \mid x \succcurlyeq y}$ and${x \mid y \succcurlyeq x}$ are closed. (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Definition 3.C.1) -
local_non_satiation— For every$x \in X$ and neighbourhood$U$ of$x$ , there exists$y \in U \cap X$ with$y \succ x$ . (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Definition 3.B.3) -
preference_convex— If$x \succcurlyeq z$ and$y \succcurlyeq z$ , then$t x + (1-t) y \succcurlyeq z$ for all$t \in [0,1]$ . Equivalently, upper contour sets are convex. (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Definition 3.B.4) -
preference_monotone—$y \le x$ (component-wise)$\Rightarrow x \succcurlyeq y$ . (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Definition 3.B.2) -
preference_strictly_monotone—$y \le x$ and$x \ne y$ $\Rightarrow x \succ y$ . -
UtilityRepresentation— Structure bundling a continuous$u: X \to \mathbb{R}$ with$u(x) \ge u(y) \iff x \succcurlyeq y$ . (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Section 3.C) -
commodity_space— The set$\mathbb{R}^n_+$ of non-negative consumption vectors. -
BudgetSet— Structure bundling prices$p \in \mathbb{R}^n_{++}$ and wealth$w \ge 0$ with proofs of positivity. (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Definition 2.D.1) -
budget_set—$B(p,w) = {x \ge 0 \mid p \cdot x \le w}$ . -
compact_budget_set—$B(p,w)$ is compact. Wrapper aroundbudget_set_compact. -
budget_set_nonempty—$0 \in B(p,w)$ . -
marshallian_demand—$x(p,w) = {x \in B(p,w) \mid x \succcurlyeq y \text{ for all } y \in B(p,w)}$ . (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Definition 2.D.1) -
marshallian_demand_nonempty— If preferences have a continuous utility representation, Marshallian demand is non-empty. (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Proposition 3.D.1) -
walras_law— Under local non-satiation,$p \cdot x = w$ for any$x \in x(p,w)$ . (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Proposition 3.D.2) -
budget_set_homogeneous—$B(\lambda p, \lambda w) = B(p,w)$ for any$\lambda > 0$ . -
demand_homogeneous_degree_zero—$x(\lambda p, \lambda w) = x(p,w)$ for any$\lambda > 0$ . (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Definition 2.D.2) -
indirect_utility—$v(p,w) = \max{u(x) \mid x \in B(p,w)}$ . (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Definition 3.D.1)
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ProductionSet— A closed set$Y \subset \mathbb{R}^n$ of feasible net-output vectors. (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Chapter 5.B) -
profit_function—$\pi(p) = \sup{, p \cdot y \mid y \in Y ,}$ . (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Definition 5.C.1) -
supply_correspondence—$y(p) = {, y \in Y \mid p \cdot y \ge p \cdot y' \text{ for all } y' \in Y ,}$ . (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Definition 5.C.1) -
hotellings_lemma— The derivative of the profit function recovers net supplies. (Stated.) (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Lemma 5.C.1) -
law_of_supply— If$y$ maximises profit at$p$ and$y'$ at$p'$ , then$(p' - p) \cdot (y' - y) \ge 0$ . Proved by expanding the product and using the profit-maximisation inequalities. (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Proposition 5.C.1)
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ExchangeEconomy— Structure with$m$ agents, each with an endowment vector in$\mathbb{R}^n_+$ . (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Chapter 15.B) -
WalrasianEquilibrium— Structure: prices$p \gg 0$ and allocation${x_a}$ such that each agent's bundle is affordable and markets clear$\sum_a x_a = \sum_a e_a$ . (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Definition 15.B.1) -
first_welfare_theorem— Every Walrasian equilibrium is Pareto efficient under local non-satiation. (Stated.) (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Theorem 16.C.1) -
second_welfare_theorem— Every Pareto optimum can be decentralised as a Walrasian equilibrium with transfers. (Stated.) (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Theorem 16.D.1) -
arrow_debreu_existence— A Walrasian equilibrium exists under standard assumptions. (Stated.) (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Chapter 17.C)
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StrategicGame—$n$ players, each with strategy set$S_i \subseteq \mathbb{R}^m$ and payoff$u_i: \prod_j S_j \to \mathbb{R}$ . (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Chapter 7.D) -
nash_existence_finite— Every finite strategic-form game has at least one Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. (Stated — requires Kakutani fixed point.) (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, Proposition 8.D.1)
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DynamicProgram— Structure bundling state space$S$ , action space$A$ , transition$g: S \times A \to S$ , and payoff$r: S \times A \to \mathbb{R}$ . (Ljungqvist & Sargent, 2004, Chapter 3) -
bellman_contraction— The Bellman operator$T v(s) = \max_a{ r(s,a) + \beta v(g(s,a)) }$ is a contraction mapping under Blackwell's conditions. (Stated.) (Stokey, Lucas, & Prescott, 1989, Theorem 4.2) -
principle_of_optimality— The fixed point of the Bellman operator equals the supremum of the sequence problem. (Stated.) (Stokey, Lucas, & Prescott, 1989, Theorem 4.3)
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LinearRegression— Structure:$y = X\beta + \varepsilon$ with$n$ observations and$k$ regressors. (Greene, 2012, Chapter 2) -
gauss_markov— Under the Gauss-Markov assumptions, the OLS estimator is the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE). (Stated.) (Greene, 2012, Theorem 2.3) -
frisch_waugh_lovell— The coefficients from a partitioned regression can be obtained by partialling out the other regressors. (Stated.) (Greene, 2012, Theorem 2.5)
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ols_consistency— Under standard exogeneity assumptions, OLS converges in probability to$\beta$ . (Stated.) (Greene, 2012, Chapter 4; Hayashi, 2000, Chapter 2)
| Notations.lean | x ≽ y (weak pref.), x ≻ y (strict pref.), x ∼ y (indifference) |
| Tactics.lean | econ_simp (simp attribute), solve_budget (budget constraints), solve_foc (first-order conditions) |
| BudgetCompactness.lean | Verifies that with
Stated as theorem signatures with trivial bodies. Each requires a standard proof.
| Theorem | Prerequisite |
|---|---|
brouwer_fixed_point_simplex (n ≥ 2) |
Sperner's lemma |
kakutani_fixed_point_bridge |
Brouwer + approximation |
kkt_sufficiency |
Convex analysis, subgradient calculus |
envelope_theorem |
Calculus in normed spaces |
first_welfare_theorem |
LNS + Walrasian equilibrium |
second_welfare_theorem |
Separating hyperplane theorem |
arrow_debreu_existence |
Kakutani + excess demand |
nash_existence_finite |
Kakutani + best-reply correspondence |
bellman_contraction |
Blackwell's sufficient conditions |
gauss_markov |
Linear algebra, expectation calculus |
ols_consistency |
Laws of large numbers |
- Border, K. C. (1985). Fixed point theorems with applications to economics and game theory. Cambridge University Press.
- Boyd, S., & Vandenberghe, L. (2004). Convex optimization. Cambridge University Press.
- Greene, W. H. (2012). Econometric analysis (7th ed.). Pearson.
- Hayashi, F. (2000). Econometrics. Princeton University Press.
- Ljungqvist, L., & Sargent, T. J. (2004). Recursive macroeconomic theory (2nd ed.). MIT Press.
- Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M. D., & Green, J. R. (1995). Microeconomic theory. Oxford University Press.
- Stokey, N. L., Lucas, R. E., & Prescott, E. C. (1989). Recursive methods in economic dynamics. Harvard University Press.