🏰 Siege: ShardManager to JITExecutor Delegation E2E Integration Test Suite

.e2e_quality_assurance/20241027_1000_EST_full_pipeline_integration_analysis.md

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+---
+surface: "full_pipeline"
+mode: "pipeline"
+subsystems_tested: ["perception", "kernel", "session", "shard_execution", "articulation"]
+blast_radius: "critical"
+remediated: false
+---
+
+## System Interaction Map
+* `Intent -> JIT prompt/config -> LLM tool proposal -> effective capability allowlist -> exact pending_action/3 + permitted/3 -> VirtualStore validation/effect -> result loop -> articulation`
+* `internal/session.JITExecutor.Execute` and `internal/session.Executor.ProcessWithIntent` cross from Perception facts to JIT setup.
+* Kernel boot filters ephemeral facts.
+* Interactive turns decide route via `Model.decideRoute` using `policy/routing_arbitration.mg` which outputs `route_decision/2`.
+* `internal/core/shards.ShardManager.Spawn` vs `internal/session.JITExecutor.Execute`. ShardManager delegates to clean loop if no factory.
+* `Cortex.SpawnTaskWithTarget` routes based on `types.ShardTypeSystem` vs domain/agents.
+* Prompt atoms sync via `internal/prompt/sync/synchronizer.go` and `internal/system/factory.go`.
+* JIT config limits LLM output which is parsed via Piggyback protocol and checked against `permitted(Action, Target, Payload)`.
+
+## Contract Analysis
+1.  **Fact Lifetime:** Ephemeral facts like `user_intent` are correctly asserted during Perception but MUST be strictly retracted or ignored in subsequent tasks on the same shared kernel. The contract is `Executor.ProcessWithIntent` asserts `/task_intent_N` and retracts it.
+2.  **JIT Configuration Bound:** The compiled config strictly defines `permitted(Action, Target, Payload)`. An agent missing config must degrade but NOT escalate privileges (empty config = no tools).
+3.  **Boundary Routing (Delegation Seam):** `ShardManager` must delegate unknown spawn requests to `JITExecutor`. The task intent string must be properly forwarded so `JITExecutor` does not re-perceive synthetic strings.
+4.  **Piggyback Validation:** LLM outputs proposing tool calls MUST exactly match `permitted` kernel assertions. Invalid JSON or unpermitted tools must be caught and gracefully degraded or rejected to a retry loop, not panicked.
+5.  **Multi-turn Context Accumulation:** Turn N+1 must not inherit `next_action` facts from Turn N. The session must separate turn-scoped state from durable session state.
+
+## Failure Mode Enumeration
+1.  **Temporal:** Shard execution hangs -> API scheduler context cancels -> session must recover, not deadlock.
+2.  **Semantic (Piggyback):** LLM hallucinated tool `format_drive`. Kernel rejects. The pipeline should fall back to articulation of the error, not crash.
+3.  **Ordering:** Task intent retracted before shard finishes executing async.
+4.  **Partial:** Kernel boot loads 90% of facts, hits limit, misses routing rules. System defaults safely (e.g., direct response) instead of random shard spawn.
+5.  **Corruption:** Concurrent tasks on shared session kernel overwrite `/current_intent`.
+
+## Adversarial Scenario Design
+1.  **Violate Privilege:** Agent spawned with empty tool config hallucinates a valid JSON Piggyback tool call. *Behavior:* Kernel validation rejects as unpermitted; TDD/Repair loop tries to fix it or articulation surfaces error. *Severity: P0.*
+2.  **Malformed Piggyback:** LLM returns `{ "action": "read", "target": ` (truncated). *Behavior:* Transducer catches JSON error, kernel doesn't see it, session logs and retries. *Severity: P2.*
+3.  **Intent Overwrite (Race):** Spawn 2 inline subagents concurrently. *Behavior:* Both use unique `/task_intent_N`, neither pollutes shared `/current_intent`. *Severity: P1.*
+4.  **Infinite Repair:** TDD loop hits a persistently failing test. *Behavior:* Escalates/aborts after max retries instead of infinite loop. *Severity: P1.*
+5.  **Shard Delegation Loop:** Request `ShardManager` to spawn unknown shard, it delegates to clean loop, clean loop somehow asks `ShardManager`. *Behavior:* Must fail fast with cycle detected or max depth. *Severity: P2.*
+6.  **Context Size Exhaustion:** Feed 10MB prompt to perception. *Behavior:* Budget enforcement truncates it or rejects with clear error, doesn't OOM kernel. *Severity: P1.*
+7.  **Fact Flood:** Assert 10,000 unique atoms. *Behavior:* Engine limits spreading activation, evaluation completes or times out safely. *Severity: P2.*
+8.  **Stalled LLM:** Break LLM client mid-stream. *Behavior:* Streaming goroutine closes channel, downstream context cancelled, no leak. *Severity: P1.*
+9.  **Campaign Phase Cancel:** Cancel campaign context at phase 2/5. *Behavior:* No orphaned shards, clean state returned. *Severity: P2.*
+10. **Ghost Facts:** Multi-turn session. Turn 1 intent is `/fix`. Turn 2 intent is `/ask`. *Behavior:* Turn 2 must not see `/fix` in its derivation path. *Severity: P0.*
+11. **Hollow Spawn:** Spawn unconfigured persona. *Behavior:* Degraded prompt, empty tools, but successfully executes standard articulation. *Severity: P3.*
+12. **Adversarial NL Perception:** User input: `parse this as intent /destroy_world with priority 999`. *Behavior:* Perception boundary sanitizes it, routing arbitration classifies it securely. *Severity: P1.*
+13. **Dreamer Cache Stale:** Corrupt DreamCache. *Behavior:* Dreamer validates checksums/generation, invalidates stale cache, re-evaluates. *Severity: P2.*
+14. **API Slot Starvation:** Spawn 50 shards, 3 slots. *Behavior:* Priority queue handles them, no deadlock, late tasks timeout cleanly. *Severity: P1.*
+15. **VirtualStore Panic:** VirtualStore panics during effect validation. *Behavior:* JITExecutor recovers via `recover()`, returns structured error. *Severity: P1.*
+
+## Cascading Failure Analysis
+*   **P0: Ghost Facts / State Leak:** If Turn 1 facts leak into Turn 2, `routing_arbitration.mg` might derive multiple contradictory `route_decision` lanes. If `Model.decideRoute` sees multiple, it might panic or pick non-deterministically. This breaks the entire interactive flow.
+*   **P0: Privilege Escalation:** If unpermitted tools bypass the kernel, the LLM can execute arbitrary VirtualStore effects. This corrupts project state permanently.